Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty by Polisson, Matthew et al.
                          Polisson, M., Quah, J. K-H., & Renou, L. (2020). Revealed
Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty. American Economic Review,
110(6), 1782-1820. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180210
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to published version (if available):
10.1257/aer.20180210
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via American
Economic Association at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20180210 . Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/user-guides/explore-bristol-research/ebr-terms/
American Economic Review 2020, 110(6): 1782–1820 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180210
1782
Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty†
By Matthew Polisson, John K.-H. Quah, and Ludovic Renou*
We develop a nonparametric method, called Generalized Restriction 
of Infinite Domains (GRID), for testing the consistency of budgetary 
choice data with models of choice under risk and under uncertainty. 
Our test can allow for risk-loving and elation-seeking attitudes, or 
it can require risk aversion. It can also be used to calculate, via 
Afriat’s efficiency index, the magnitude of violations from a particu-
lar model. We evaluate the performance of various models under risk (expected utility, disappointment aversion, rank-dependent utility, 
and stochastically monotone utility) using data collected from sev-
eral recent portfolio choice experiments. (JEL C14, D11, D12, D81)
This paper is a methodological contribution to the empirical investigation of 
decision making under risk and under uncertainty. While the expected utility (EU) 
model is the most widely used model for decision making in these contexts, there is 
also active research developing models that give a better account of observed choice 
behavior. A literature that tests the EU and other models on experimental data has 
emerged alongside these theoretical developments. These experiments often employ 
elicitation procedures in which subjects make repeated choices between two risky 
or uncertain outcomes; the data obtained in this way consist of a finite number of 
binary choices, which can then be used to partially recover a subject’s preference. A 
more recent strand of experiments employs a different elicitation procedure, which 
we shall call the budgetary choice procedure, where subjects choose a preferred 
option from an effectively infinite set of alternatives. For example, a subject could 
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face a portfolio problem where she allocates her budget between two assets with 
 state-contingent payoffs. An early experiment of this kind, the data from which 
we analyze in this paper, is found in Choi et al. (2007).1 Other examples include 
Loomes (1991); Gneezy and Potters (1997); Bayer et al. (2013); Ahn et al. (2014); 
Choi et al. (2014); Hey and Pace (2014); Cappelen et al. (2015); and Halevy, Persitz, 
and Zrill (2018).
For reasons which we explain below, the nonparametric evaluation of data col-
lected through a budgetary choice procedure requires a new approach. The contri-
bution of this paper is twofold: (i) we develop a new empirical method that could 
be used to analyze data (be it experimental or field data) collected from portfolio 
decisions, and (ii) we apply this new method to evaluate the performance of differ-
ent models of choice under risk using data from a number of recent portfolio choice 
experiments. Our method allows us to determine whether a dataset is consistent with 
the EU model or some of its generalizations, without making parametric assump-
tions on the Bernoulli function (such as constant relative risk aversion) or on other 
features of the model. This is empirically important because if we happen to find 
that a dataset is incompatible with a given model, then we can safely conclude that 
this incompatibility is attributable to the model itself rather than a poorly selected 
parametric form. Since the test also yields a utility function (which need not be 
unique) that best fits the data, this can be used to make  out-of-sample predictions.
Our method can also be applied to test models of intertemporal choice (such as 
discounted utility) and other models which are formally similar to the EU model and 
its generalizations. Budgetary choice procedures are increasingly used in experi-
ments to study intertemporal consumption (see, for example, Andreoni and Sprenger 
2012 and Imai and Camerer 2018).
Testing EU and Other Models on a Finite Grid.—A feature of the budgetary 
choice procedure is that instead of requiring a subject to choose one alternative or 
another, it allows her to calibrate a response and to choose something “in between.” 
But this feature is also the crucial reason why the nonparametric analysis of data 
collected from this procedure requires a new empirical method, whereas no such 
method is necessary for binary choices. Indeed, suppose that we make a finite num-
ber of observations, where at observation  t a subject chooses a lottery that gives a 
monetary payoff  x s t in state  s over one that gives  y s t in state  s (for  s = 1, 2,  … ,  s –), 
and where the probability of state  s is commonly known to be  π s > 0 . Imagine that 
we would like to test if this dataset is consistent with the EU model. Checking for 
exact consistency with the EU model simply involves finding a strictly increasing 
Bernoulli function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + such that  ∑ s=1  s – π s u ( x s t) ≥  ∑ s=1  s – π s u ( y s t) holds at 
every observation  t . This amounts to solving a finite set of linear inequalities,2 and 
it is computationally straightforward to ascertain if a solution exists. However, it is 
clear that this method will no longer work when the subject is instead choosing from 
(classical) linear budget sets, since even a single observed choice from a budget set 
reveals an infinite set of binary preferences between the chosen bundle and alterna-
tives in the budget.
1 See this paper also for an account of the advantages of a budgetary choice approach.
2 The unknowns to be solved for are  {u (r) : r =  x s t  or   y s t  for some t and s} .
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We now give a short and intuitive explanation of our new method. Consider a 
dataset with three observations and two states, as depicted in panel A of Figure 
1; the horizontal axis corresponds to consumption in state 1, and the vertical axis 
to consumption in state 2. The subject chooses the contingent consumption bun-
dle  𝐱 1 =  (2, 4) from budget set  B 1 ,  𝐱 2 =  (6, 1) from  B 2 , and  𝐱 3 =  (4, 3) from  B 3 , 
where  B 1 ,  B 2 , and  B 3 are linear budget sets.3 Assume that the probability of state  s is 
commonly known to be  π s . This dataset is said to be consistent with the EU model (or  EU-rationalizable) if there is a continuous and strictly increasing Bernoulli func-
tion  u such that  π 1 u (2) +  π 2 u (4) ≥  π 1 u ( x 1 ) +  π 2 u ( x 2 ) for all  𝐱 =  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) in  B 1 , 
and similarly at the other two observations.
We show (in Theorem 1) that this dataset can be rationalized by the EU model if 
it can be rationalized on an appropriately restricted consumption set. Let   be the 
set of consumption levels that are observed to have been chosen at some observa-
tion and in some state, plus zero; in this example   =  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6} . Then for the 
dataset to be  EU-rationalizable, it is sufficient (and obviously necessary) for it to 
be  EU-rationalizable on the finite set    2 , i.e., there is a strictly increasing function 
u – :  →  ℝ + such that the expected utility of  𝐱 1 =  (2, 4) is greater than any other 
bundle in  B 1 ∩    2 , and so forth.4 We refer to    2 as the grid generated by the data-
set; it is depicted by the open circles in panel B of Figure 1. Therefore, checking if a 
dataset is  EU-rationalizable involves checking if there is a solution to a finite set of 
linear inequalities, a problem which is computationally feasible to solve.
Since the key to our test is the restriction of an infinite consumption space to a 
finite grid, we refer to it as the method of Generalized Restriction of Infinite Domains 
3 Note that each  B t consists of the budget line and all of the bundles below the line.
4 For example, since  (1, 6) ∈  B 1 ∩   2 ,  u – must satisfy  π 1 u –(2) +  π 2 u –(4) >  π 1 u –(1) +  π 2 u –(6) . A full set of 
inequalities that  u – must satisfy is displayed in Table 1.
Figure 1. The GRID Method
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(GRID).5 The GRID method can also be used to test for consistency with other mod-
els of choice under risk (such as the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model (Quiggin 
1982) and the disappointment aversion (DA) model (Gul 1991) and under uncertainty 
(such as the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989)).6
The test we just described requires that the Bernoulli function be continuous 
and strictly increasing, but not necessarily concave, so a risk-loving  EU-maximizer 
would pass the test. This is as it should be if model consistency is the principal 
concern. The stronger hypothesis that a subject is an  EU-maximizer with a concave 
Bernoulli function can also be tested using a GRID method, where the test involves 
checking the superiority of the chosen bundle against a finite set of alternatives 
within each budget, though that finite set is constructed differently (and will no lon-
ger be the intersection of the budget with   2 ).
Empirical Implementation and Findings.—We implement our empirical method 
on three datasets obtained from the well-known portfolio choice experiments in 
Choi et al. (2007, 2014) and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018). In doing so, we are 
able to demonstrate the versatility and practicality of the GRID method, and also 
to reveal some empirical features common to all three datasets. In the Choi et al. 
(2007) experiment, each subject was asked to purchase  Arrow-Debreu securities 
under different linear budget constraints. There were two states of the world, and it 
was commonly known that states occurred either symmetrically (each with proba-
bility 1/2) or asymmetrically (one with probability 1/3 and the other with probabil-
ity 2/3); the experimental designs in Choi et al. (2014) and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill 
(2018) closely resemble the symmetric design in Choi et al. (2007).
We use the GRID method developed in this paper to test the model performance 
of the EU, DA, and RDU models. We also check whether a subject’s observations are 
consistent with the maximization of some locally nonsatiated utility function on the 
contingent consumption space. This is the most permissive utility model possible and 
forms the backdrop to our empirical analysis; Afriat’s (1967) Theorem tells us that 
compatibility with utility maximization can be assessed by testing the Generalized 
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).7 The GARP test could be strengthened to 
test for consistency with the maximization of a utility function that is stochastically 
monotone, in the sense that if a bundle dominates another with respect to first-order 
stochastic dominance, then it must have higher utility; a test for stochastically mono-
tone utility maximization has recently been developed by Nishimura, Ok, and Quah 
(2017), and we implement it in this paper for the first time. The EU, DA, and RDU 
models are all special cases of stochastically monotone utility maximization, which 
is in turn more stringent than locally nonsatiated utility maximization.
In a rich budgetary choice environment with many observations on behavior, 
a dataset would typically not pass GARP (let alone more stringent requirements) 
5 It is “generalized” because one could think of the domain restriction used in this case (the grid   2 ) as a gener-
alization of the one used in Afriat’s Theorem (see Section IB).
6 Our contribution should not be confused with Polisson and Quah (2013), which studies conditions for ratio-
nalizability in the presence of one or more goods that can only be consumed in discrete amounts. In that case, the 
consumption space is actually discrete; here, we show how to check for  rationalizability via a suitable discretization 
of the consumption space, but the space is not, in fact, discrete.
7 This term and its acronym were coined by Varian (1982), which also provided a proof of Afriat’s Theorem.
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exactly. It is, however, possible to quantify a dataset’s departure from rationalizabil-
ity by a given model using the critical cost efficiency index (Afriat 1973); this index 
is widely used in the empirical revealed preference literature, including in Choi et al. 
(2007, 2014), while Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) implements a variant of this 
index first proposed by Varian (1990). The efficiency index runs from 1 to 0, with 
the index equal to 1 if a dataset passes the test exactly. We adopt this measure of 
rationality throughout our empirical implementation.8
For each subject, we are able to calculate that subject’s efficiency indices for the 
different models under consideration. Across the three experiments, a negligible 
number of subjects pass GARP exactly. In the case of the primarily undergraduate 
subjects in Choi et al. (2007) and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018), more than 80 
percent would pass GARP if we set a threshold of 0.9 for the efficiency index. In the 
case of the large-scale experiment (involving a representative sample) in Choi et al. 
(2014), the efficiency indices for GARP are distinctly lower, with nearly 60 percent 
passing GARP at the 0.9 efficiency threshold. The following highlights some salient 
features of the data collected from the three experiments:
• A significant minority of subjects either violate GARP and/or stochastic mono-
tonicity; the decisions of these subjects cannot be explained by the EU, DA, or 
RDU models, all of which respect first-order stochastic dominance.
• Around one-half of the subjects who pass GARP (at some reasonable efficiency 
threshold) would also be compatible with the EU model; for these subjects, the 
EU model seems a good model of behavior, provided that some allowance is 
made for optimization errors.
• We find no evidence that the DA model accounts for the behavior of a signifi-
cant proportion of subjects not accounted for by the EU model.
• On the other hand, there is some evidence that the RDU model could explain a 
significant segment of the population not behaving as  EU-maximizers.9
Since our testing procedure also produces, for each subject, a rationalizing util-
ity function belonging to a given model, that recovered utility function could then 
be used to make  out-of-sample predictions. We carry out a simple exercise of this 
type, using a rank-dependent utility function estimated from a subject’s portfolio 
decisions, to make predictions on the subject’s choice when she is independently 
presented with a choice between two lotteries. Our objective is to not check how 
often the procedure makes correct predictions, since the data we have access to do 
not allow us to explore that question in a meaningful way, but simply to illustrate the 
potential usefulness of our nonparametric methods for this purpose.
Relationship with the Revealed Preference Literature.—Our paper is related to the 
revealed preference literature originating from Afriat’s (1967) Theorem, which char-
acterizes price and demand observations that are consistent with the  maximization 
8 We also carry out some empirical analysis using Varian’s index, which is reported in the online Appendix. The 
calculation of Varian’s index is more computationally demanding than calculating Afriat’s, so our analysis using 
that index does not cover all of the models under consideration.
9 When there are two equiprobable states, the RDU and DA models are known to be equivalent. Our finding that 
RDU explains significantly more behavior than EU is specific to the asymmetric treatment in Choi et al. (2007).
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of a locally nonsatiated utility function (see also Diewert 1973 and Varian 1982). A 
natural follow-up to Afriat’s contribution is to characterize those datasets which are 
rationalizable by more specialized utility functions. Among these papers are those 
which characterize state price and contingent consumption demand observations 
that are consistent with the EU model10 and (in more recent papers) some of its gen-
eralizations: these include Varian (1983a, b, 1988); Green and Srivastava (1986); 
Diewert (2012); Bayer et al. (2013); Echenique and Saito (2015); Chambers, Liu, 
and Martinez (2016); and Chambers, Echenique, and Saito (2016).11 The principal 
difference between our results and this literature is that we do not rely on the suffi-
ciency of first-order conditions. This has two important implications: (i) the models 
we consider need not induce a convex preference over the contingent consumption 
space (e.g., we allow for risk-loving behavior under EU or elation-seeking behav-
ior under DA), and (ii) we can weaken the requirement that the constraint set is a 
linear budget set. For reasons which we give in Section II, allowing for nonlinear 
constraint sets enables our method to be used to calculate Afriat’s efficiency index.
Organization of the Paper.—Section  I describes how one can use the GRID 
method to test the EU, DA, and RDU models. When a dataset is not fully con-
sistent with a particular model, the method can also help calculate the Afriat and 
Varian efficiency indices; this is described in Section II. Section III explains how the 
method could be extended to evaluate models where concavity is imposed on the 
Bernoulli function. The empirical implementation is in Section IV. Further applica-
tions of the GRID method to test models of decision making under risk/uncertainty, 
or over time, are found in the online Appendix. The online Appendix also describes 
and implements a new algorithm for calculating Varian’s index for the locally nonsa-
tiated (GARP), stochastically monotone, and expected utility models; readers inter-
ested in calculating Varian’s index may find this useful, whether or not they plan to 
apply the GRID method.
I. The GRID Method
We assume that there is a finite set of states, denoted by  S =  {1, 2,  … ,  s –} . The 
contingent consumption space is  ℝ +  s – ; for a typical consumption bundle  𝐱 ∈  ℝ +  s – , 
the  s th entry,  x s , specifies the consumption level in state  s .12 There is a finite dataset,
   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T ,
10 The EU model requires the utility function on the contingent consumption space to be additively separable. 
There are also results which characterize datasets that are rationalizable by a weakly separable utility function (see 
Varian 1983a and Quah 2014).
11 There is also a closely related literature on recovering expected utility from asset or contingent consumption 
demand functions, where, in effect the dataset is assumed to be infinite (see, for example, Dybvig and Polemarchakis 
1981 and Kubler, Selden, and Wei 2014).
12 Our results do depend on the realization in each state being  one-dimensional (which can be interpreted as 
a monetary payoff, but not a bundle of goods). This case is the one most often considered in applications and 
experiments and is also the assumption in a number of recent papers, including Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014); 
Echenique and Saito (2015); and Chambers, Echenique, and Saito (2016). The papers by Varian (1983a, b); Green 
and Srivastava (1986); Bayer et al. (2013); and Chambers, Liu, and Martinez (2016) allow for  multidimensional 
realizations. However, and crucially, in all of these papers, convexity of the agent’s preference over contingent 
consumption and linear budget sets are also required.
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consisting of  T observations, where  𝐱 t ∈  B t and  B t ⊂  ℝ +  s – . We could interpret 
this as data collected from an experiment where the subject chooses the bundle  𝐱 t 
from the constraint set  B t at observation  t and this will indeed be our interpretation 
throughout the paper.13 We assume that  B t is a compact set.
We denote the upper boundary of  B t by  ∂ B t ; an element  𝐱 ∈  B t is said to be in  ∂ B t 
if there is no  𝐱′ ∈  B t such that  𝐱′ > 𝐱 .14 The downward extension of  B t is the set
  B ¯
t =  {𝐲 ∈  ℝ +  s ¯ : 𝐲 ≤ 𝐱 for some 𝐱 ∈  B t } . 
Obviously,  B ¯
t contains  B t . The most important example of a constraint set is the 
classical or linear budget set. At price vector  𝐩 ∈  ℝ ++  s – and wealth  w > 0 , the 
classical budget set is   (𝐩, w) = {𝐱 ∈  ℝ +  s – : 𝐩 · 𝐱 ≤ w} . By a classical dataset, 
which we denote by   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  𝐩 t ) } t=1 T , we mean a dataset where, at observation  t , 
the subject chooses  𝐱 t from
(1)  B t =  ( 𝐩 t ,  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) =  {𝐱 ∈  ℝ +  s – :  𝐩 t · 𝐱 ≤  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t } . 
Thus,  can also be written as  { ( 𝐱 t ,  ( 𝐩 t ,  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) ) } t=1 T . Note that the upper 
boundary of   ( 𝐩 t ,  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) is simply the budget plane, i.e.,  ∂  ( 𝐩 t ,  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) 
=  {𝐱 ∈  ℝ +  s – :  𝐩 t · 𝐱 =  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t } , while the downward extension of   ( 𝐩 t ,  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) is 
itself. The experiments conducted in Choi et al. (2007, 2014) and Halevy, Persitz, 
and Zrill (2018), the data from which we analyze in Section IV, involve subjects 
choosing from classical budget sets with two states.
Bear in mind, however, that our formulation only requires  B t to be compact and it 
does not have to be a linear budget set. A nonlinear budget set occurs when a subject 
chooses contingent consumption through a portfolio of securities in an incomplete 
market (i.e., loosely speaking, when the number of securities is fewer than the num-
ber of states); in this case, the budget set will not be linear, but it will be compact so 
long as the security prices do not admit arbitrage.15 In this paper, the crucial appli-
cation requiring  B t to be nonlinear is in quantifying approximate rationalizability 
when a dataset   cannot be exactly rationalized; as we explain in Section II, this 
requires testing the rationalizability of a modified dataset that has nonlinear con-
straint sets, even if the true constraint sets are linear budget sets.
Before presenting the formal results, we provide an informal explanation of the 
general approach we adopt in ascertaining whether a dataset   is compatible with a 
given model of decision making under risk or uncertainty. We first notice that most 
of these models have two essential components: a Bernoulli function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + 
and an aggregator function  ϕ :  ℝ +  s – → ℝ , so that the utility of a bundle  𝐱 is 
 ϕ (u ( x 1 ) , …, u ( x  s – ) ) . For a given aggregator  ϕ , the first step is to test whether there 
exists a Bernoulli function  u that rationalizes the data, i.e., at each observation  t , 
13 Obviously nothing in principle forecloses the possibility of applying our method to observational budgetary 
choice data of the type found in insurance or financial decision problems.
14 For the vectors  𝐱 ,  𝐲 ∈  ℝ  s – , we write  𝐱 ≥ 𝐲 if  x s ≥  y s for all  s , and  𝐱 > 𝐲 if  𝐱 ≥ 𝐲 and  𝐱 ≠ 𝐲 ; if  x s >  y s 
for all  s , we write  𝐱 ≫ 𝐲 .
15 Indeed, there is  𝐩 t ≫ 0 such that  B t =  {𝐱 ∈  ℝ +  s – :  𝐩 t · 𝐱 ≤  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t } ∩  { Z t +  ω t } , where  Z t is the span of 
assets available to the agent and  ω t is the agent’s endowment of contingent consumption at observation  t . Both  B t 
and  𝐱 t will be known to the observer, if he knows the asset prices, the agent’s holding of securities, the asset payoffs 
in every state, and the agent’s endowment of contingent consumption.
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the utility of the chosen bundle  𝐱 t is weakly greater than the utility of any other 
bundle  𝐱 ∈  B t . Theorem 1 provides that test. However, a model may correspond to 
a family of aggregators  ϕ . If so, there is a second step that involves testing whether 
there is an aggregator in the family of aggregators under consideration and a 
Bernoulli function  u which together rationalize the data. We now turn to the formal 
exposition.
Let  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T be a collection of functions, where  ϕ( · , t) :  ℝ +  s – → ℝ is con-
tinuous and strictly increasing.16 The dataset   =  {( 𝐱 t ,  B t )} t=1 T is said to be 
rationalizable by  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T if there exists a continuous and strictly increasing 
function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + , which we shall refer to as the Bernoulli function, such that
(2)  ϕ (𝐮 ( 𝐱 t ) , t) ≥ ϕ (𝐮 (𝐱) , t)  for all 𝐱 ∈  B t , 
where  𝐮 (𝐱) =  (u ( x 1 ) , u ( x 2 ) , …, u ( x  s – ) ) . In other words, the observed choice behav-
ior is consistent with the hypothesis that, at observation  t , the subject has chosen a 
bundle from  B t that maximizes the utility function  ϕ (𝐮 ( · ) , t) :  ℝ +  s – → ℝ .17
The function  ϕ ( · , t) aggregates the vector of “utils”  𝐮 (𝐱) into a single number. 
Of course, the most familiar formula for  ϕ ( · , t) arises in the expected utility (EU) 
model; in this case, if the probability of state  s at observation  t is objectively known 
to be  π s t > 0 , then
(3)  ϕ ( u 1 ,  u 2 ,  … ,  u  s – , t) =  ∑ 
s=1
 s –
 π s t  u s . 
Other models will lead to different formulations of  ϕ (as we illustrate in Section ID). 
Note that the objective probabilities need not vary across observations; if they do 
not,  ϕ would be independent of  t .
Two requirements are imposed on the Bernoulli function  u . Continuity is an 
important technical condition because it guarantees that  ϕ (𝐮 ( · ) , t) is continuous, 
which in turn guarantees that the agent’s utility maximization problem always has 
a well-behaved solution on compact constraint sets.18 The other requirement on  u 
is that it is strictly increasing. Notice that some assumption of this type is neces-
sary: in particular, if we allow  u to be a constant function then every dataset  is 
rationalizable because the subject would be indifferent across all bundles in  ℝ +  s – . 
Requiring  u to be strictly increasing is reasonable since its argument is typically 
interpreted as money. This assumption, together with the assumption that  ϕ ( · , t) is 
a strictly increasing function guarantees that
(4)  ϕ (𝐮 ( 𝐱 t ) , t) > ϕ (𝐮 (𝐱) , t)  for all 𝐱 ∈  B ¯t \∂ B t .19
16 By strictly increasing, we mean that  ϕ (𝐳, t) > ϕ (𝐳′, t) if  𝐳 > 𝐳′ .
17 In keeping with the more empirically oriented parts of the revealed preference literature, this definition allows 
for the possibility that there are other bundles  𝐱 in  B t that maximize  ϕ (𝐮 (·) , t) .
18 To be precise, it guarantees that the optimal solutions form a nonempty compact set and is (in the case of 
demand) an upper hemicontinuous correspondence of prices.
19 Indeed, if x ∈  B _ t \∂ B t , then there is y ∈  B t such that y ≥ x and by the optimality of  x t , ϕ(u( x t ), t) ≥ ϕ(u(y), t). 
If y = x then y ∈  B t \∂ B t , so ϕ(u( x t ), t) > ϕ(u(y), t) = ϕ(u(x), t). Otherwise, y > x and by the strict increasing 
property, ϕ(u( x t ), t) ≥ ϕ(u(y), t) > ϕ(u(x), t).
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In other words, a bundle that is not on the boundary of the constraint set has strictly 
lower utility than the chosen bundle  𝐱 t .
Note that, for three related reasons, we do not require  u to be concave. First, the 
concavity of  u is not a fundamental part of EU theory or many of its generalizations 
and it is desirable to have a test with a minimum of ancillary assumptions, so that 
any rejection of the model would be decisive and could not be attributed to the effect 
of those assumptions. This is relevant because we know that the concavity of  u 
imposes observable restrictions on portfolio choices over and above those implied 
by the EU model (see online Appendix Section A4.1).20 Second, in portfolio choice 
settings, concavity of  u is often imposed because (along with other assumptions 
on  ϕ ) it ensures the convexity of the agent’s preference over contingent consumption 
bundles (equivalently, the quasiconcavity of the utility function defined on  ℝ +  s – ); 
this in turn facilitates the mathematical analysis of portfolio choice. However, as 
emphasized by Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2017), there is a distinction between 
 out-of-sample predictions made with and without the convexity property, and the 
sharper conclusions obtained by imposing this property can be misleading. Lastly, 
departures from the concavity of  u have been specifically exploited to explain certain 
specific empirical phenomena; an early paper of that type is Friedman and Savage 
(1948). In prospect theory, the nonconcavity of the Bernoulli function around a ref-
erence point also plays a crucial role.21 So there is advantage in having a test that is 
agnostic about the curvature of  u .
A. The Main Result
Let  Y be any subset of  ℝ + . Given a Bernoulli function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + , the 
function  u – : Y →  ℝ + is the restriction of  u to  Y , if the functions agree on  Y , i.e., 
 u –(r) = u (r) for all  r ∈ Y . In the other direction, a Bernoulli function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + 
is said to extend a function  u – : Y →  ℝ + if the two functions agree on  Y .
Given a dataset   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T , we define
(5)    ∗ =  {0} ∪  {r ∈  ℝ + : r =  x s t for some t and s} ; 
besides 0,    ∗ contains those levels of consumption that are chosen at some obser-
vation and in some state. Since the dataset is finite, so is    ∗ . Let   be a finite subset 
of  ℝ + containing    ∗ . We define   =    s – and shall refer to   as the grid associated 
with . Suppose that   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T is rationalizable by  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T with the 
Bernoulli function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + . If  u – :  →  ℝ + is the restriction of  u to   , then
(6)  ϕ ( 𝐮– ( 𝐱 t ) , t) ≥ ϕ ( 𝐮–  (𝐱) , t)  for all 𝐱 ∈  B ¯t ∩  
(where  𝐮– (𝐱) =  ( u –( x 1 ) ,  u –( x 2 ) ,  … ,  u –( x  s – ) ) ), and
20 Readers familiar with Afriat’s Theorem will know that in that context, requiring the concavity of the ratio-
nalizing utility function  U (defined on the consumption space  ℝ +  s – ) imposes no observable restrictions. However, 
it does not logically follow that imposing concavity on  u is also innocuous, because the EU model implies that  U 
must also be additive across states.
21 An extension to gains/losses around a reference point is in online Appendix Section A3.4.
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(7)  ϕ ( 𝐮–  ( 𝐱 t ) , t) > ϕ ( 𝐮–  (𝐱) , t)  for all 𝐱 ∈  ( B ¯t \∂ B t ) ∩ . 
This follows immediately from (2) and (4) since  u (r) =  u ¯(r) for all  r ∈  
and  B t ∩  ⊂  B t and  ( B ¯t \∂ B t ) ∩  ⊂  B ¯t \∂ B t . In other words, if  u rationalizes the dataset  then it will continue to rationalize the dataset if the consumption space 
is restricted to the grid   . Our main theorem says that the converse of this statement 
is also true.22
THEOREM 1: Suppose that   =  { ( x t ,  B t ) } t=1 T is rationalizable by the collection 
of continuous and strictly increasing functions  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T with the Bernoulli func-
tion  u :  핉 + →  핉 + . Let  be a finite set in  핉 + that contains    ∗ (as defined by (5)) 
and let   =    s – . Then the restriction of  u to ,  u – :  →  핉 + , satisfies conditions (6) and (7).
Conversely, suppose that given   =  { ( x t ,  B t ) } t=1 T and a collection of continuous 
and strictly increasing functions  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T , there is a strictly increasing function 
u – :  →  핉 + that satisfies conditions (6) and (7). Then there is a Bernoulli func-
tion  u :  핉 + →  핉 + that extends  u – and with which   =  { ( x t ,  B t ) } t=1 T is rationaliz-
able by  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T .
This theorem tells us that testing for the rationalizability of   is equivalent to test-
ing for rationalizability in the case where the agent’s consumption space is restricted 
to the grid   . Crucially, this reduces the rationality requirements to a finite number 
of optimality conditions involving the observed choices and alternatives (see (6) 
and (7)). We refer to this approach to revealed preference testing as the method of 
Generalized Restriction of Infinite Domains (GRID), or simply, the GRID method 
or GRID test. The domain restriction is “generalized” because Afriat’s Theorem 
could also be understood as providing a test with such an approach (see Section IB 
for more details), even though the domain restrictions in the two results differ. 
Indeed there are results characterizing rationalizability in other models that could 
be thought of as using a GRID approach.23
The intuition for Theorem 1 ought to be strong. Given  u – satisfying (6) and (7), we 
can define the step function  u ˆ :  ℝ + →  ℝ + where  u ˆ(r) =  u –( [r] ) , with  [r] being the 
largest element of   weakly lower than  r , i.e.,  [r] = max {r′ ∈  :  r′ ≤ r} . Notice 
that  ϕ ( ?ˆ?  ( 𝐱 t ) , t) = ϕ ( 𝐮– ( 𝐱 t ) , t) and, for any  𝐱 ∈  B ¯t ,  ϕ ( ?ˆ?  (𝐱) , t) = ϕ ( 𝐮– ( [𝐱] ) , t) , 
where  [𝐱] =  ( [ x 1 ] ,  [ x 2 ] , …,  [ x  s – ] ) is in  B ¯t ∩  . Clearly, if  u – obeys (6) and (7) then   
is rationalized by  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T and  u ˆ (in the sense that (2) holds). This falls short of 
22 We cannot replace  B ¯
t with  B t in (6) and (7). For example, suppose  𝐱 1 =  (1, 0) is chosen from 
 B 1 =  { ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) ∈  ℝ + 2 : 2 x 1 +  x 2 = 2} and  𝐱 2 =  (0, 1) is chosen from  B 2 =  { ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) ∈  ℝ + 2 :  x 1 + 2 x 2 = 2} (so 
the constraint sets are straight lines). These observations cannot be rationalized by any increasing utility function 
and, in particular, cannot be rationalized in the sense of Theorem 1 (with  ϕ constant across  t ). However, since 
  =  { (0, 0) ,  (0, 1) ,  (1, 0) ,  (1, 1) } ,  B 1 ∩  =  { (1, 0) } and  B 2 ∩  =  { (0, 1) } , conditions (6) and (7) hold if  B ¯t is 
replaced with  B t . On the other hand  ( B ¯1 \∂ B 1 ) ∩  contains  (0, 1) and  ( B ¯2 \∂ B 2 ) ∩  contains  (1, 0) , so (7) requires 
 ϕ ( 𝐮 – ( 𝐱 1 ) ) > ϕ ( 𝐮 – ( 𝐱 2 ) ) and  ϕ ( 𝐮 – ( 𝐱 1 ) ) < ϕ ( 𝐮 – ( 𝐱 2 ) ) , which plainly cannot happen. This allows us to conclude, cor-
rectly, that this dataset is not rationalizable.
23 Proposition 1 devises a GRID test for  EU-rationalizability with concave Bernoulli functions. Other papers 
using what could be broadly understood as a GRID approach include Quah (2014); Dziewulski and Quah (2014); 
and Chambers, Liu, and Martinez (2016). Note, however, that these results characterize different models, involve 
different domain restrictions, and have different proofs from Theorem 1.
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the claim in the theorem only because  u ˆ is neither continuous nor strictly increas-
ing;24 the proof in the Appendix shows how one could in fact construct a function 
with these additional properties.
Note that Theorem 1 gives some leeway on how   is chosen. If we are sim-
ply interested in testing for the rationalizability of   by a given model, then we 
could pick   =    ∗ , but sometimes it is advantageous to let   be a strictly larger 
set (see Section IC on making  out-of-sample predictions). Note also that in check-
ing the conditions (6) and (7) we can confine ourselves to checking those bundles 
 𝐱 ′ in  B ¯t ∩  which are not dominated by some other bundle in  B ¯t ∩  . This is because if  𝐱′ > 𝐱″ and property (6) or (7) holds for  𝐱 = 𝐱 ′, it will also hold 
for  𝐱 = 𝐱″ since both  ϕ and  u – are strictly increasing.
B. Testing the Expected Utility Model
Theorem 1 provides us with a convenient way of testing for rationalizability by 
the EU model. Consider an experiment where the probability of any state can be 
(possibly) varied across observations and where these probabilities are announced, 
so that both the observer and the subject know that the probability of state  s at 
observation  t is  π s t > 0 . The dataset   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T is  EU-rationalizable if 
there is a Bernoulli function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + such that  ∑ s=1  s – π s t u ( x s t) ≥  ∑ s=1  s – π s t u ( x s ) 
for all  𝐱 ∈  B t . Theorem 1 tells us that   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T is  EU-rationalizable if 
and only if there is a strictly increasing function  u – :  →  ℝ + for which (6) and (7) 
hold, with  ϕ given by (3), i.e.,
(8)  ∑ 
s=1
 s –
 π s t  u –( x s t) ≥  ∑ 
s=1
 s –
 π s t  u –( x s )  for all 𝐱 ∈  B ¯t ∩ 
and 
(9)  ∑ 
s=1
 s –
 π s t  u –( x s t) >  ∑ 
s=1
 s –
 π s t  u –( x s )  for all 𝐱 ∈  ( B ¯t \∂ B t ) ∩ . 
This is a system of linear inequalities, and solving it is both formally possible (in 
the sense that there is an algorithm that can decide within a known number of steps 
whether it has a solution) and computationally feasible.
As an example of how this works in practice, consider again the dataset depicted 
in panel A of Figure 1. Suppose that it is commonly known that the probability of 
state  s ( s = 1, 2 ) at observation  t is  π s t . Since the three observed choices are  𝐱 1 = (2, 4) ,  𝐱 2 =  (6, 1) , and  𝐱 3 =  (4, 3) ,    ∗ =  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6} . Choosing   =    ∗ , 
 EU-rationalizability can be tested by checking for a solution to the conditions listed 
in Table 1. In the top-left panel are the strict inequalities guaranteeing that  u – is strictly 
increasing. The other panels list the conditions for the optimality of  x 1 in  B 1 ,  x 2 in 
 B 2 , and  x 3 in  B 3 .25 For example, at observation 1, the observed choice is  𝐱 1 =  (2, 4) 
and there are 18 bundles in  B 1 ∩  (besides  𝐱 1 ), of which only the two bundles  (1, 6) 
24 Recall that the Bernoulli function  u is continuous and strictly increasing by definition.
25 Recall that since each  B t is a linear budget set, we have  B ¯
t =  B t for all t.
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and  (3, 1) are undominated,26 with the former in the interior of the budget set and the 
latter on the upper boundary. The first inequality in the top-right panel is imposed by 
(9) and the second inequality by (8). Similarly, the reader can check that there are two 
undominated bundles in  B 2 ∩  and two in  B 3 ∩  , leading to the inequality conditions 
displayed in the bottom panels.  EU-rationalizability holds if there is a  u – that solves the 
linear inequalities displayed in Table 1.27
At this point it is worth emphasizing that requiring a dataset to be  EU-rationalizable 
is certainly more stringent than simply requiring it to be rationalizable by a locally 
nonsatiated utility function (on the contingent consumption space  ℝ +  s – ). Indeed, 
while a dataset with a single observation  ( 𝐱 1 ,  𝐩 1 ) must necessarily be rationalizable 
in that sense, even a single observation can be incompatible with the EU model.
Example 1: Suppose that at the price vector  p 1 =  (1, 2) , the subject chooses 
the bundle  x 1 =  (1, 2) . This subject is buying more of the more expensive 
good, which is incompatible with the maximization of expected utility when 
the two states are equiprobable. It would, of course, fail the GRID test. Indeed, 
let   =    ∗ =  {0, 1, 2} . In panel A of Figure 2, we depict  x 1 chosen from  B 1 =  B ¯1 =  {x ∈  핉 + 2 :  x 1 + 2 x 2 ≤ 5} , and with the grid   =    2 inserted in panel B. 
Clearly,  (2, 1) ∈  ∩  ( B 1 \∂ B 1 ) ; comparing  x 1 =  (1, 2) with  (2, 1) , condition (9) 
requires  0.5 u –(1) + 0.5 u –(2) to be strictly greater than itself, which is impossible.28
Afriat’s Theorem characterizes classical datasets that are rationalizable by locally 
nonsatiated utility functions. Readers who are familiar with Afriat’s Theorem will 
notice some similarity between it and Theorem 1, in the sense that both results 
involve revealed preference relationships (such as (6) and (7), or the EU versions 
(8) and (9)), between the chosen bundle  𝐱 t and a finite subset of the budget set  B ¯t . In the case of Theorem 1 this subset is  B ¯t ∩  whereas in the case of Afriat’s Theorem, the comparison is with  B ¯t ∩  , where   =  { 𝐱 t } t=1 T . Theorem 1 requires a relaxation of the domain restriction used in Afriat’s Theorem (  , which contains   ) because it 
characterizes rationalizability by utility functions with added structure. This is clear 
26 See the remarks at the end of Section IA.
27 If  π s t = 1/2 for all  t, s , the reader can verify that one solution to this problem is  u –(0) = 0 ,  u –(1) = 1 ,  u –(2) = 4 ,  u –(3) = 6 ,  u –(4) = 8 , and  u –(6) = 9 , i.e., the dataset depicted in panel A of Figure 1 is  EU-rationalizable.
28 If the state probabilities are not known to the observer then it is impossible to reject expected utility with only 
one observation. Instead the observation in Example 1 would tell us that state 2 is more probable than state 1. This 
means that if there is another observation where the subject buys more of state 1 consumption even though it is 
more expensive, an observer could conclude that the agent is not maximizing expected utility. This is the essential 
idea in Epstein (2000).
Table 1—Conditions on  u – for EU-Rationalizability
Monotonicity of  u – Optimality of  𝐱 1 =  (2, 4) 
 u –(6) >  u ¯(4) >  u –(3) >  u –(2)  π 1 1u –(2) +  π 2 1u –(4) >  π 1 1u –(1) +  π 2 1u –(6) 
 u –(2) >  u –(1) >  u –(0)  π 1 1u –(2) +  π 2 1u –(4) ≥  π 1 1u –(3) +  π 2 1u –(1) 
Optimality of  𝐱 2 =  (6, 1) Optimality of  𝐱 3 =  (4, 3) 
 π 1 2u –(6) +  π 2 2u –(1) ≥  π 1 2u –(0) +  π 2 2u –(3)  π 1 3u –(4) +  π 2 3u –(3) >  π 1 3u –(2) +  π 2 3u –(4) 
 π 1 2u –(6) +  π 2 2u –(1) ≥  π 1 2u –(3) +  π 2 2u –(2)  π 1 3u –(4) +  π 2 3u –(3) >  π 1 3u –(6) +  π 2 3u –(1) 
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from Example 1, where the observation is not  EU-rationalizable, even though the 
inequalities (8) and (9) are trivially satisfied in  B ¯1 ∩  , since   =  { 𝐱 1 } .29There is a further connection between the two results. In the case of Afriat’s 
Theorem, the revealed preference relations can be formulated as a  no-cycling condi-
tion among the elements of   called the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(GARP). By appealing to a result of Fishburn (1975), it is possible to characterize 
 EU-rationalizabilty in terms of a condition that is stronger than GARP but similar 
to it in the sense that it forbids a generalized notion of a revealed preference cycle 
on the set   . These observations are discussed in greater detail in online Appendix 
Section A1.2.
C. Making  Out-of-Sample Predictions
Once it has been ascertained that a subject’s behavior is consistent with a given 
model, it would be natural to exploit this compatibility by using the same model 
to make predictions of that subject’s  out-of-sample behavior. We now explain how 
this can also be done using the GRID method. To simplify our discussion, we only 
explain this in the context of the EU model; making predictions when some other 
model is assumed can be carried out in a similar fashion. The procedure outlined 
here is implemented in Section IVB.
Suppose   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T is collected from a subject who is  EU-rationalizable (with objective probabilities  π s t > 0 for all  t and  s ). Using the information from  
and assuming that the subject is behaving as an  EU-maximizer, how can we pre-
dict the subject’s choice between two lotteries: lottery A, which pays out  a i with 
probability  α i > 0 (for  i = 1, 2 , with  α 1 +  α 2 = 1 ), and lottery B which pays 
out  b i with probability  β i > 0 (for  i = 1, 2, with  β 1 +  β 2 = 1 )? In formal terms, a 
strict preference for A over B is consistent with the EU model if there is a Bernoulli 
function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + which  EU-rationalizes  and satisfies  α 1 u ( a 1 ) +  α 2 u ( a 2 ) >  β 1 u ( b 1 ) +  β 2 u ( b 2 ) . Whether  u exists can easily be answered using Theorem 1. 
In this case, it is convenient to choose   to be strictly larger than    ∗ . Specifically, 
let   =    ∗ ∪  { a 1 ,  a 2 ,  b 1 ,  b 2 } . Since  is  EU-rationalizable, there must be a 
29 For other results which involve comparing  𝐱 t with a subset of  B ¯t that is larger than  B ¯t ∩  , see footnote 23.
Figure 2. The GRID Method Applied to Example 1
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strictly increasing function  u – :  →  ℝ + that solves the inequalities (8) and (9). 
Furthermore, Theorem 1 tells us that  u – has an extension  u , with domain  ℝ + , that 
rationalizes . Therefore, to ascertain whether a strict preference for A over B is 
consistent with the EU model, a necessary and sufficient test is whether there is a 
strictly increasing function  u – :  →  ℝ + that, in addition to (8) and (9), obeys
(10)  α 1 u –( a 1 ) +  α 2 u –( a 2 ) >  β 1 u –( b 1 ) +  β 2 u –( b 2 ) . 
This test is easy to implement since (10) is a linear inequality. Note that because 
there are potentially multiple Bernoulli functions that  EU-rationalize the data, it is 
entirely possible that both a strict preference for A over B and a strict preference for 
B over A are consistent with the EU model: in this case, there will be an increasing 
function  u – that solves (8), (9), and (10), and another one that solves (8), (9), and 
(10), the last with the inequality reversed.
D. Testing Other Models Using the GRID Method
So far, we have considered tests of  EU-rationalizability in the case where 
the probability of each state is known to both the agent and the observer. 
Our test could be extended to the case where no objective probabilities can 
be attached to each state. A dataset   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T is rationalizable by 
subjective expected utility (SEU) if there exists a probability distribution 
 π =  ( π 1 ,  π 2 , …,  π  s ¯ ) ≫ 0 and a Bernoulli function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + such that, at every 
observation  t , we have  ∑ s=1  s – π s u ( x s t) ≥  ∑ s=1  s – π s u ( x s ) for all  𝐱 ∈  B t . In this case,  ϕ 
is independent of  t and is required to belong to the family  Φ SEU such that  ϕ ∈  Φ SEU 
if  ϕ (𝐮) =  ∑ s=1  s – π s  u s for some  π ≫ 0 . By Theorem 1,   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T can be 
rationalized by some  ϕ ∈  Φ SEU if and only if there is a strictly increasing  u – such 
that (8) and (9) hold for some  π ≫ 𝟎 . These conditions form a system of inequal-
ities bilinear in the unknowns  { π s } s=1  s ¯ and  { u –(r) } r∈ .
For many of the standard models of decision making under risk, under uncer-
tainty, or over time, the rationalizability problem has a structure similar to that of 
SEU in the sense that it involves finding a Bernoulli function  u and an aggregator 
function  ϕ belonging to some family  Φ that together rationalize the data, and this 
problem can in turn be transformed via Theorem 1 into a problem of solving a 
system of bilinear inequalities. In online Appendix Section A3, we use Theorem 
1 to devise such tests for various models of contingent choice, including choice 
acclimating personal equilibrium (Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2007), maxmin expected util-
ity (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci, 
and Rustichini 2006), and a model with budget-dependent reference points. We 
also explain how we could test models of choice over time on data from budgetary 
allocations, such as those collected by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). A model of 
discounted utility (with or without present bias) is formally very similar to the sub-
jective expected utility model.
Even though solving a bilinear problem may be computationally intensive, the 
 Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem tells us that this problem is decidable, in the sense that 
there is a known algorithm that can determine in a finite number of steps whether 
a solution exists. Nonlinear tests are not new to the revealed preference  literature; 
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for example, they appear in tests of weak separability (Varian 1983a), in tests of 
maxmin expected utility and other models of ambiguity (Bayer et al. 2013), and in 
tests of Walrasian general equilibrium (Brown and Matzkin 1996). Solving these 
problems can be computationally straightforward in some cases because of special 
features of the model/environment or when the number of observations is small. 
The tests that we develop simplify dramatically and are easily implementable in 
practice when there are only two states (though they remain nonlinear).
The  two-state case, while special, is very common in applied theoretical settings 
and laboratory experiments. For example, to implement the SEU test, we simply 
condition on the probability of state 1 (and hence on the probability of state 2), and 
then perform a linear test to check whether there is a strictly increasing function 
u – solving (8) and (9). If not, we choose another probability for state 1, implement 
the test, and repeat (if necessary). Even a uniform grid search of up to two decimal 
places on the probability of state 1 will lead to no more than 99 linear tests, which 
can be implemented with very little difficulty.30
Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU).—In Section  IV, we report the findings of an 
empirical test of the RDU model (Quiggin 1982) when there are two states, so we 
explain this case of the model, and its corresponding test, in detail here. The online 
Appendix contains a full treatment of the  multi-state case (see Sections A2 and A4).
Consider an experiment where the probabilities of states 1 and 2 are objectively 
known and given by  π 1 > 0 and  π 2 > 0 . With no loss of generality, assume 
that  π 1 ≥  π 2 . In the RDU model, the subject behaves as though these probabilities 
are distorted: if state  s is the less favorable state, i.e., the state where the payoff is 
smaller, then the weight given to state  s is  ρ s , with this distortion respecting the rank 
of the objective probabilities, i.e.,
(11)  1 >  ρ 1 >  ρ 2 > 0 if  π 1 >  π 2  and   1 >  ρ 1 =  ρ 2 > 0 if  π 1 =  π 2 .
The utility of  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) when  x 1 ≤  x 2 is  V ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) =  ρ 1 u ( x 1 ) +  (1 −  ρ 1 ) u ( x 2 ) and the 
utility of  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) when  x 1 >  x 2 is  V ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) =  (1 −  ρ 2 ) u ( x 1 ) +  ρ 2 u ( x 2 ) . Converting 
this into the framework of Theorem 1, we are testing rationalizability in the case 
where  ϕ has the form
(12)  ϕ ( u 1 ,  u 2 ) =  {  ρ 1  u 1 +  (1 −  ρ 1 )  u 2  if  u 1 ≤  u 2     (1 −  ρ 2 )  u 1 +  ρ 2  u 2 if  u 1 >  u 2 . 
By Theorem 1, a necessary and sufficient condition for   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T to be 
 RDU-rationalizable is for there to be  ρ 1 and  ρ 2 obeying (11) and a strictly increasing 
u – such that with  ϕ defined by (12), the conditions (6) and (7) admit a solution. Given 
the formula for  ϕ , this test involves solving a set of inequalities that are bilinear in 
the unknowns  { u –(r) } r∈ and  { ρ 1 ,  ρ 2 } . When implementing this test, we let  ρ 1 and  ρ 2 
take different values on a very fine grid in  [0, 1] 2 , subject to (11), and (for each 
30 While we have not found it necessary to use them in our implementation in this paper, there are solvers 
available for mixed integer nonlinear programs (for example, as surveyed in Bussieck and Vigerske 2010) that are 
potentially useful for implementing bilinear tests more generally.
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case) perform the corresponding linear test to search for a solution in  { u –(r) } r∈ ;  
is  RDU-rationalizable if such a solution exists for some values of  ρ 1 and  ρ 2 .
As an illustration, consider again the dataset displayed in panel A of Figure 1. In 
Table 2 we collect the relevant inequalities for rationalizability by  ϕ as defined by 
(12); the dataset can be rationalized by  ϕ (for specific values of  ρ 1 and  ρ 2 ) if and 
only if there is  u – that satisfies the inequalities displayed in the table. Comparing this 
test with the test for  EU-rationalizability (displayed in Table 1), notice that there is 
no change to   or to   , nor is there a change to the relevant comparisons at each 
observation (for example at observation 1,  (2, 4) is compared against  (1, 6) and  (3, 1) 
in both tables). The difference between them is in the functional form, with the 
 EU-form in Table 1 and the  RDU-form in Table 2.
Disappointment Aversion (DA).—We also implement a GRID test of the DA 
model (Gul 1991). When there are two states, the DA model is a special case of 
RDU, with a further restriction on  ρ 1 and  ρ 2 . Specifically, there is  β ∈  (− 1, ∞) 
such that, for  s = 1, 2 ,
(13)  ρ s =   (1 + β)  π s  _1 +  π s β  . 
Note that this restriction has bite only if  π 1 ≠  π 2 , so the RDU and DA models 
coincide when  π 1 =  π 2 . If  β = 0 , the agent simply maximizes expected utility. 
If  β > 0 , we have  ρ s >  π s ; the agent attaches a probability to state  s that is higher 
than the objective probability when state  s is the less favorable state and the agent is 
said to be disappointment averse. If  β < 0 , then  ρ s <  π s , and the agent is elation 
seeking. Similar to RDU, we test the DA model by letting  β take on different values 
and performing the corresponding linear test.31
While it is well known that the RDU and EU models lead to different predictions, 
it not immediately clear that they are observationally distinct in the context of obser-
vations drawn from linear budgets. We end this section with an example of a dataset 
that is  RDU-rationalizable but not  EU-rationalizable.
Example 2: Suppose the dataset consists of three observations as depicted in 
Figure 3 where  x 1 =  (a, a) ,  x 2 =  (b, b) , and  x 3 =  (c, d) . Note that  (b, c) is on the 
first observation’s budget line and  (a, d) is on the second observation’s budget line. 
31 In practice, we let  ρ 1 take on different values on  (0, 1) , back out the corresponding value of  β (according to (13)) and then work out  ρ 2 (with (13)).
Table 2—Conditions on  u – for RDU-Rationalizability Given  ( ρ 1 ,  ρ 2 ) 
Monotonicity of  u – Optimality of  𝐱 1 =  (2, 4) 
 u –(6) >  u –(4) >  u –(3) >  u –(2)  ρ 1 u –(2) +  (1 −  ρ 1 ) u –(4) >  ρ 1 u –(1) +  (1 −  ρ 1 ) u –(6) 
 u –(2) >  u –(1) >  u –(0)  ρ 1 u –(2) +  (1 −  ρ 1 ) u –(4) ≥  (1 −  ρ 2 ) u –(3) +  ρ 2 u –(1) 
Optimality of  𝐱 2 =  (6, 1) Optimality of  𝐱 3 =  (4, 3) 
 (1 −  ρ 2 ) u –(6) +  ρ 2 u –(1) ≥  ρ 1 u –(0) +  (1 −  ρ 1 ) u –(3)  (1 −  ρ 2 ) u –(4) +  ρ 2 u –(3) >  ρ 1 u –(2) +  (1 −  ρ 1 ) u –(4) 
 (1 −  ρ 2 ) u –(6) +  ρ 2 u –(1) ≥  (1 −  ρ 2 ) u –(3) +  ρ 2 u –(2)  (1 −  ρ 2 ) u –(4) +  ρ 2 u –(3) >  (1 −  ρ 2 ) u –(6) +  ρ 2 u –(1) 
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The price at observation  t is  p t =  (1,  q t ) , where  q 1 > 1 > 1/ q 1 ≥  q 2 >  q 3 . 
Consequently the first budget line is the flattest and the third budget line is the steepest.
We claim that these observations are not  EU-rationalizable if the two states are 
equiprobable. Suppose that they are, for some Bernoulli function  u . Then the first 
observation tells us that  2u (a) ≥ u (b) + u (c) , since  (b, c) is available when  (a, a) is 
chosen. Similarly, from the second observation, we know that  2u (b) ≥ u (a) + u (d) . 
Together this gives
  u (b) − u (d) ≥ u (a) − u (b) ≥ u (c) − u (a) , 
from which we obtain  u (a) + u (b) ≥ u (c) + u (d) . But this is contradicted by obser-
vation 3 where  (c, d) is chosen even though  (a, b) is in the interior of the budget set.
However, these observations are  RDU-rationalizable. This should be quite 
intuitive because the demand pattern involves stickiness on the 45-degree line 
over a range of prices, with the demand deviating away from  x 1 =  x 2 only 
when (at the third observation) state 2 consumption is sufficiently cheap. Indeed, 
suppose  V ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) = ρu ( x 1 ) +  (1 − ρ) u ( x 2 ) when  x 1 ≤  x 2 and  V ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) =  (1 − ρ) u ( x 1 ) + ρu ( x 2 ) when  x 1 >  x 2 , with  ρ ∈  (1/2, 1) , so the agent displays 
disappointment aversion. It is straightforward to check that if  u is strictly concave, 
then the agent’s utility is maximized at  x 1 =  x 2 at observations 1 and 2 so long 
as  ρ ≥ 1/ (1 +  q 2 ) and  ρ ≥  q 1 / (1 +  q 1 ) . Since we assume that  1/ q 1 ≥  q 2 , the 
Figure 3.  RDU-Rationalizable but Not  EU-Rationalizable Dataset
c
c
a
b
d
a b
B3
B2
B1
x1
x2
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first inequality is tighter than the second. Let us set  ρ = 1/ (1 +  q 2 ) . It remains for 
us to find a Bernoulli function that rationalizes the third observation. It suffices to 
find  u :  핉 + →  핉 + such that  u′ > 0 and  u″ < 0 and  u′ (c) and  u′ (d) satisfy the 
first-order condition
  
ρu′ (c)  _________   (1 − ρ) u′ (d)  =  1 _  q 2  
u′ (c)  ____
u′ (d)  =  1 _  q 3 . 
Since  d > c and  q 2 >  q 3 , such a function  u must exist.
II. Measuring Departures from Rationalizability
The revealed preference tests presented in the previous section are “sharp,” in the 
sense that a dataset either passes the test for a given model or it fails. This either/or 
feature of the tests is not particular to our results but is true of all classical revealed 
preference tests, including Afriat’s. It would, of course, be desirable to develop a 
way of measuring the extent to which a given class of utility functions succeeds 
or fails in rationalizing a dataset, and the most common approach adopted in the 
revealed preference literature to address this issue was developed by Afriat (1972, 
1973) and Varian (1990) in the context of classical datasets, i.e., datasets with clas-
sical budget sets (see (1)).32,33 The basic idea is that if a consumer’s choice fails to 
maximize utility, then it is natural to compare what he spent with what he could have 
spent in order to achieve the same utility level. This gives us a metric to quantify 
the utility loss in expenditure terms. We now give an account of this approach and 
explain how to use the GRID method to calculate this index.
Let   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  𝐩 t ) } t=1 T be a classical dataset. For any number  e t ∈  [0, 1] , we 
define
(14)  B t ( e t ) =  ( 𝐩 t ,  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) ∪  { 𝐱 t } =  {𝐱 ∈  ℝ +  s – :  𝐩 t · 𝐱 ≤  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t } ∪  { 𝐱 t } . 
Notice that when  e t = 1 , this set coincides with the true budget set   ( 𝐩 t ,  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) 
(see (1)). If  e t < 1 , then  B t ( e t ) is a shrunken version of this set that retains the 
observed choice  𝐱 t but removes all bundles for which total expenditure at  𝐩 t is 
strictly higher than  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t , i.e., those bundles  𝐱 where  𝐩 t · 𝐱 >  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t . Clearly 
 B t ( e t ) shrinks with the value of  e t . Given  𝐞 =  ( e t ) t=1 T , we refer to 
  (𝐞) =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ( e t ) ) } t=1 T as a modified dataset.
Let  be a collection of utility functions defined on  ℝ +  s – belonging to a given 
family; for example,   could be the family of locally nonsatiated utility func-
tions, which was the family considered by Afriat (1972, 1973) and Varian (1990). 
The modified dataset   (𝐞) is rationalizable by   if there is  U ∈  such that 
 U ( 𝐱 t ) ≥ U (𝐱) for all  𝐱 ∈  B t ( e t ) . Clearly, if   (𝐞) is rationalizable by   , then so is 
32 For examples where  Afriat-Varian type indices are used to measure a model’s fit, see Mattei (2000); Harbaugh, 
Krause, and Berry (2001); Andreoni and Miller (2002); Choi et al. (2007, 2014); Beatty and Crawford (2011); and 
Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018). See also Echenique, Lee, and Shum (2011), which develops and applies a related 
index called the money pump index.
33 Varian (1990) and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) discuss why such measures may be more suitable than 
other measures such as the sum of squared errors between observed and predicted demands.
1800 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2020
  (𝐞′) for any  𝐞′ < 𝐞 , since shrinking budget sets will make it easier for 
 rationalizability to hold. Furthermore, if  U (𝐱) ≥ U (𝟎) for all  𝐱 ≥ 𝟎 for 
some  U ∈  , then   (𝐞) is rationalizable at  𝐞 = 𝟎 (since  B t (0) =  {𝟎,  𝐱 t } for all  t ), 
though in general   (𝐞) will be rationalizable by   without shrinking budget sets so 
drastically. This suggests that if   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  𝐩 t ) } t=1 T is not rationalizable by   , then 
one way of measuring the severity of this failure is to measure the extent to which 
budget sets need to shrink to obtain rationalizability. This is the key idea behind the 
indices proposed by Afriat and Varian.
Afriat’s proposal is to shrink all budget sets by the same factor  e 
(so  𝐞 =  (e, e, …, e) ) and to find the largest number  e at which   (𝐞) is rationaliz-
able by   . Afriat refers to
  sup {e :   (e, e, …, e)  is rationalizable by } 
as the critical cost efficiency index; we shall also refer to it as Afriat’s efficiency 
index or Afriat’s index. Of course if   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  𝐩 t ) } t=1 T is itself rationalizable by   , 
then this index equals 1. If this index equals  e ∗ < 1 , then it means that there is some 
utility function in   for which the observed choice  𝐱 t is superior to every bundle 
that costs less than  e ∗  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t , but rationality is limited because there is some obser-
vation  t′ and a bundle  𝐲 costing more than  e ∗  𝐩 t′ ·  𝐱 t′ but less than  𝐩 t′ ·  𝐱 t′ that gives 
strictly higher utility than  𝐱 t′ .
The alternative measure proposed by Varian (1990) allows different budget sets 
to shrink by different factors; the degree to which a dataset is not consistent with a 
particular model is then given by the smallest sum of square differences between the 
efficiency vector  𝐞 and the vector  (1, 1, …, 1) , i.e.,  ∑ t=1 T (1 −  e t ) 2 .  Renormalizing 
this measure to facilitate comparison with Afriat’s index, we define Varian’s effi-
ciency index as
  sup {1 −  √ __________   ∑ t=1 T (1 −  e t ) 2 __________T :  (𝐞) is rationalizable by } . 
When   is rationalizable by   , both Varian’s index and Afriat’s equal 1. In both 
cases, a higher number indicates greater consistency with a model, but Varian’s 
index is always weakly higher than Afriat’s since it maximizes over a greater set of 
efficiency vectors.
Even though Varian’s index is in a sense more discriminating than the one pro-
posed by Afriat, Afriat’s measure is more commonly used because it is much easier 
to compute: while calculating the latter simply requires searching for a threshold  e ∗ 
at which the modified dataset is just rationalizable by   ,34 calculating Varian’s 
index requires searching through all efficiency vectors  𝐞 .35 In our empirical analysis 
in Section IV, we use Afriat’s efficiency index, because it is easy to compute and 
34 The binary search algorithm works as follows. We first set the lower and upper bounds on  e ∗ to  e L = 0 
and  e H = 1 , respectively. We then check whether the dataset passes or fails the test at  e =  ( e L +  e H ) / 2 ; if it passes 
the test, then we update both  e ∗ and its lower bound to  ( e L +  e H ) / 2 ; if it fails the test, then we update  e ∗ to  e L and 
the upper bound on  e ∗ to  ( e L +  e H ) / 2 . We then repeat the procedure, selecting and testing the new midpoint of the 
updated lower and upper bounds. The algorithm terminates when the lower and upper bounds are sufficiently close, 
in our case within  10 −6 of one another.
35 In fact, it is known that calculating Varian’s index is an NP hard problem (Smeulders et al. 2014).
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because it facilitates comparison with other papers, which mostly use this index. But 
we also calculate Varian’s index for some (though not all) of the models we con-
sider, using a new algorithm we developed that searches for the optimal efficiency 
vector  𝐞 (see online Appendix Sections A8 and A9).
A. Testing the  EU-Rationalizability of   (𝐞) 
Whether one is calculating Afriat’s index or Varian’s, it will require 
checking if a modified dataset   (𝐞) =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ( e t ) ) } t=1 T is rationalizable 
by   . When   is the family of all locally nonsatiated utility functions, a gener-
alization of Afriat’s Theorem provides a test for the rationalizability of   (𝐞) 
=  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ( e t ) ) } t=1 T (described in detail in online Appendix Section  A5.1). In the 
case where   is the family of expected utility or rank-dependent utility functions, 
we can perform a GRID test.
To be specific, consider a dataset   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  𝐩 t ) } t=1 T collected from an exper-
iment in which state  s occurs with probability  π s > 0 at every observation. 
Suppose that for a given  𝐞 =  ( e t ) t=1 T , we would like to check whether   (𝐞) is 
 EU-rationalizable or, in the language of this section, whether it is rationalizable 
by   , where  U :  ℝ +  s – →  ℝ + is in   if  U (𝐱) =  ∑ s=1  s – π s u ( x s ) for some Bernoulli 
function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + . By Theorem 1, a necessary and sufficient condition for 
rationalizability is that there is a strictly increasing function  u – :  →  ℝ + that sat-
isfies (8) and (9), which form a set of linear conditions. Note that the constraint set 
at observation  t is  B t ( e t ) (which is not a linear or even convex budget set) and its 
downward extension is  {𝐱 ∈  ℝ +  s – :  𝐩 t · 𝐱 ≤  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t } ∪  {𝐱 ∈  ℝ +  s – :  𝐱 ≤  𝐱 t } .
As an illustration, we return to the example first depicted in panel A of Figure 1 and 
suppose we shrink  B 1 and  B 2 by  e 1 ,  e 2 < 1 respectively but leave  B 3 as it is (so that 
 𝐞 =  ( e 1 ,  e 2 , 1) ), as shown in panel A of Figure 4. The downward extensions of 
 B 1 ( e 1 ) ,  B 2 ( e 2 ) , are depicted in panel B, along with  B 3 (which is unchanged and 
coincides with its downward extension). In this case,    ∗ =  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6} , we can 
choose   =    ∗ , and (by Theorem 1)   (𝐞) is  EU-rationalizable if and only if there 
is  u – that solves the inequalities in Table 3. We again have the strict monotonicity 
conditions in the top-left panel, with the other panels listing the optimality con-
ditions applicable to  𝐱 1 ,  𝐱 2 , and  𝐱 3 . There are 17 bundles in  B ¯1 ( e 1 ) ∩  (besides the observed choice  𝐱 1 =  (2, 4) ); two of them,  (1, 6) and  (3, 0) , are undominated 
and both lie on the upper boundary, which leads (by condition (8)) to the weak 
inequalities displayed in the top-right panel. There is just one undominated bundle, (2, 2) , in  B ¯2 ( e 2 ) ∩  (besides  𝐱 2 ); this leads to the strict inequality displayed in the bottom-left panel (by condition (9)). The optimality conditions on  𝐱 3 are essentially 
unchanged from those displayed in Table 1.
Checking for the  RDU-rationalizability of   (𝐞) involves a similar procedure, 
with the functional form modified as explained in Section ID.
B. Approximate Smooth Rationalizability
While Theorem 1 guarantees that there is a Bernoulli function  u that extends 
u – :  →  ℝ + and rationalizes the data when the required conditions are satisfied, 
the Bernoulli function is not necessarily smooth. The smoothness of  u is commonly 
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assumed in applications of expected utility and related models and its implications 
can appear to be stark. For example, suppose that it is commonly known that states 
1 and 2 occur with equal probability and that we observe the agent choosing  (1, 1) 
at a price vector  ( p 1 ,  p 2 ) , with  p 1 ≠  p 2 . This observation is incompatible with a 
smooth EU model; indeed, given that the two states are equiprobable, the slope of 
the indifference curve at  (1, 1) must equal  − 1 and thus it will not be tangential to the 
budget line and will not be a local optimum. On the other hand, it is trivial to check 
that this observation is  EU-rationalizable in our sense. In fact, one could even find 
a concave Bernoulli function  u :  ℝ + →  ℝ + for which  (1, 1) maximizes expected 
utility. (Such a  u will be continuous and strictly increasing, but have a kink at 1.)
These two facts are reconcilable. Given any strictly increasing and continuous 
function  u defined on a compact interval of  ℝ + , there is a strictly increasing and 
smooth function  u ̃ that is uniformly and arbitrarily close to  u on that interval. Thus, if 
a Bernoulli function  u rationalizes   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ) } t=1 T by  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T , then for any 
efficiency threshold  e ∈  (0, 1) , there is a smooth Bernoulli function  u ̃ that rational-
izes  ′ =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t (e) ) } t=1 T by  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T . In other words, if a dataset is rational-
izable by a Bernoulli function, then it can also be rationalized by a smooth Bernoulli 
function, for any efficiency threshold arbitrarily close to 1. In this sense, imposing a 
smoothness requirement on the Bernoulli function does not radically alter a model’s 
ability to explain a dataset.
Figure 4. The GRID Method Applied to a Modified Dataset
Panel A. Modied dataset with e = (e1, e2, 1) Panel B. Modied dataset with grid inserted
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Table 3—Conditions on  u – for the EU-Rationalizability of   (𝐞) 
Monotonicity of  u – Optimality of  𝐱 1 =  (2, 4) 
 u –(6) >  u –(4) >  u –(3) >  u –(2)  π 1 u –(2) +  π 2 u –(4) ≥  π 1 u –(1) +  π 2 u –(6) 
 u –(2) >  u –(1) >  u –(0)  π 1 u –(2) +  π 2 u –(4) ≥  π 1 u –(3) +  π 2 u –(0) 
Optimality of  𝐱 2 =  (6, 1) Optimality of  𝐱 3 =  (4, 3) 
 π 1 u –(6) +  π 2 u –(1) >  π 1 u –(2) +  π 2 u –(2)  π 1 u –(4) +  π 2 u –(3) >  π 1 u –(2) +  π 2 u –(4) 
 π 1 u –(4) +  π 2 u –(3) >  π 1 u –(6) +  π 2 u –(1) 
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III. Concave Bernoulli Functions
A common assumption in applications of expected utility (EU) theory is that 
agents are risk averse, which is equivalent to the concavity of the Bernoulli 
function. The necessary and sufficient conditions that we have developed for 
 EU-rationalizability (in Theorem 1) neither require nor guarantee that the 
Bernoulli function is concave. This distinction is significant because there are 
datasets which can be rationalized by the EU model, but only with nonconcave 
Bernoulli functions. This will be made readily apparent in the empirical imple-
mentation in Section  IV, but we also provide an intuitive example of such a 
phenomenon, in a classical dataset with two observations, in online Appendix 
Section A4.1.
In this section we provide a test for concave  EU-rationalizability, i.e., 
 EU-rationalizability with a concave Bernoulli function. (Recall that, by definition, 
the Bernoulli function is continuous and strictly increasing.) Unfortunately, we do 
not, in this case, have a result like Theorem 1 which is applicable to observations 
drawn from general compact constraint sets. Our procedure works in a narrower set 
of environments: it allows us to test for the concave  EU-rationalizability of a clas-
sical dataset   =  { ( 𝐱 t ,  𝐩 t ) } t=1 T , and also when it is modified by  𝐞 =  ( e t ) t=1 T , i.e., 
the dataset   (𝐞) = { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t (e t )) } t=1 T (with  B t ( e t ) defined by (14)). Note that there 
is already a test of concave  EU-rationalizability for classical datasets (see Varian 
1983a and Green and Srivastava 1986), but that test makes use of the sufficiency of 
the first-order conditions, which in turn relies crucially on the linearity of the clas-
sical budget sets; since  B t ( e t ) is not a convex set, that method does not obviously 
extend to testing for the concave  EU-rationalizability of   (𝐞) . The added value of 
our approach lies in its applicability to modified datasets, which (as we explain in 
Section II) enables us to calculate the critical cost efficiency index when   itself is 
not concave  EU-rationalizable.
Our test for concave  EU-rationalizability is another instance of a GRID test: we 
identify, in the modified budget set  B t ( e t ) , a finite number of bundles for which the 
superiority of the chosen bundle  𝐱 t over these bundles is sufficient to guarantee the 
optimality of  𝐱 t over all bundles in  B t ( e t ) . However, the set of comparison bundles 
will be chosen differently from the case where concavity is not required (it is no 
longer   ∩  B t ( e t ) ).
We shall confine our discussion in this section  to the test for concave 
 EU-rationalizability when there are two states with commonly known, strictly pos-
itive probabilities  π 1 and  π 2 ; the test when there are multiple states is covered in 
online Appendix Section A4.3. (Tests for the RDU model with a concave Bernoulli 
function are presented in Sections A4.2 and A4.3.) To explain this test we need some 
definitions and a key observation.
Let  r – > 0 be a real number such that  r –  p s t ≥  p t ·  x t for all  t and  s . Notice that, in 
any state and at any observation, the subject cannot afford to choose a consumption 
level strictly higher than  r –. Thus, for the purposes of rationalizing a dataset, the 
behavior of the Bernoulli function beyond  r – is of no relevance. We define
(15)    ∗∗ =  {0} ∪  {r ∈  ℝ +  :  r =  x s t  for some t and s} ∪  { r –} 
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and let   ⊂  ℝ + be a finite set containing    ∗∗ .36
For any function  h 
– :  →  ℝ + , we define the piecewise linear extension of  h – (or 
simply linear extension of  h 
–
for short) as the function  h –ℓ :  ℝ + →  ℝ + that is linear 
between adjacent points in   , with  h –ℓ (r) =  h –(r) for all  r ∈  .37,38 Thus, if  r < r′ 
are adjacent points in   ,
  h 
–
ℓ (a) = λ h –(r) +  (1 − λ) h –(r′) whenever a = λr +  (1 − λ) r′ for λ ∈  (0, 1) . 
The importance of piecewise linear functions comes from the following key 
observation:
Suppose   (e) is  EU-rationalizable by the concave Bernoulli function  u and 
let  u – :  →  핉 + be the restriction of  u to . Then   (e) is  EU-rationalizable 
by  u –ℓ :  핉 + →  핉 + , the linear extension of  u –.
To see why this is true, note that  u –ℓ (r) = u (r) for all  r ∈  and the con-
cavity of  u guarantees that  u (r) ≥  u ¯ℓ (r) for all  r ∈  [0,  r ¯] . Thus,  π 1 u ( x 1 t ) +  π 2 u ( x 2 t ) =  π 1  u –ℓ ( x 1 t ) +  π 2  u –ℓ ( x 2 t ) for all  𝐱 t =  ( x 1 t ,  x 2 t ) and, for any other bundle 
 𝐱 =  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) , we have  π 1 u ( x 1 ) +  π 2 u ( x 2 ) ≥  π 1  u –ℓ ( x 1 ) +  π 2  u –ℓ ( x 2 ) . Since
  π 1 u ( x 1 t ) +  π 2 u ( x 2 t ) ≥  π 1 u ( x 1 ) +  π 2 u ( x 2 )  for all 𝐱 =  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) ∈  B t ( e t ) , 
we also have
  π 1  u –ℓ ( x 1 t ) +  π 2  u –ℓ ( x 2 t ) ≥  π 1  u –ℓ ( x 1 ) +  π 2  u –ℓ ( x 2 )  for all 𝐱 =  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) ∈  B t ( e t ) , 
which completes the proof of our claim.
It follows from this key observation that in searching for concave Bernoulli func-
tions that  EU-rationalize   (𝐞) , we can confine our search to linear extensions of 
some  u – :  →  ℝ + . But how do we check that  u –ℓ  EU-rationalizes the data?
Let   =  { (a, b) ∈  ℝ + 2  : a, b ∈  [0,  r –]  and either a or b is in } . The set  looks 
a like a net containing   =   2 . (In Figure 5, it is the net formed by the dashed 
lines.) If  u –ℓ  EU-rationalizes   (𝐞) , then, obviously, at every observation  t ,
(16)  π 1  u –ℓ ( x 1 t ) +  π 2  u –ℓ ( x 2 t ) ≥  π 1  u –ℓ ( x 1 ) +  π 2  u –ℓ ( x 2 ) 
 for all 𝐱 =  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) ∈  ∩ ∂  ( 𝐩 t ,  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) .
(Recall that  ∂  ( 𝐩 t ,  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) is the upper boundary of the budget set   ( 𝐩 t ,  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) 
and is equal to the budget line, i.e.,  {𝐱 ∈  ℝ + 2 :  𝐩 t · 𝐱 =  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t } .) It turns out that 
this condition is also sufficient for  EU-rationalizability.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose the dataset   (e) is  EU-rationalizable with probabil-
ity  ( π 1 ,  π 2 ) ≫  (0, 0) by a concave Bernoulli function  u :  핉 + →  핉 + . Let   be a 
36 The definition of    ∗∗ is similar to    ∗ (see (5)), but the latter does not include  r –.
37 Two points  r and  r′ are adjacent in   if there is no point in   between  r and  r′ .
38 Strictly speaking,  h 
–
ℓ is not uniquely defined for  r >  r –, but the value of  h –ℓ beyond  r – is irrelevant.
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finite set in  핉 + containing    ∗∗ (as defined by (15)). Then the restriction of  u to , 
u – :  →  핉 + , has the following properties: (i)  u –(r) <  u –(r′) if  r < r′ ; (ii) for any 
three adjacent points  r < r′ < r″ in   ,
  
 u –(r′) −  u –(r)   _________
r′ − r ≥  
 u –(r″) −  u –(r′) 
  __________
r″ − r′ ; 
and (iii)  u –ℓ :  핉 + →  핉 + , the linear extension of  u –, satisfies (16) at all  t .
Conversely, if  u – :  →  핉 + satisfies (i), (ii), and (iii), then its linear extension  u –ℓ 
is a concave Bernoulli function that  EU-rationalizes   (e) .
If   (𝐞) is  EU-rationalizable by a concave Bernoulli function  u , then (i) holds 
because  u is increasing, (ii) holds because  u is concave, and (iii) is necessary 
because the linear extension  u –ℓ also  EU-rationalizes the data. For the converse, it 
is clear that conditions (i) and (ii) respectively guarantee that  u –ℓ :  ℝ + →  ℝ + is an 
increasing and concave function. The proof in the Appendix shows that if (iii) also 
holds, then  u –ℓ  EU-rationalizes   (𝐞) . The importance of this proposition is that it 
provides us with an  easy-to-implement test, since conditions (i) to (iii) translate into 
a finite set of linear inequalities on a finite set of unknowns  { u –(r) } r∈ , and checking 
whether a solution exists is a straightforward matter.
As an illustration of how this test works, we consider the dataset   (𝐞) previ-
ously depicted in panel A of Figure 4. Given that the three observed choices are (2, 4) ,  (6, 1) , and  (4, 3) , and choosing  r – = 10 , we obtain    ∗∗ =  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10} . 
Letting   =    ∗∗ , the test involves setting up a collection of linear inequalities in 
the unknowns  { u –(r) } r∈ (corresponding to conditions (i) to (iii)) and checking if it 
has a solution. Conditions (i) and (ii) are clear enough, so let us explain condition 
(iii), which guarantees the optimality of the observed choice  𝐱 t over a finite set of 
alternatives in  B t ( e t ) . To be specific, consider its restrictions on the second observa-
tion. In Figure 5, we zoom in on  B 2 ( e 2 ) , where  is indicated by the dashed lines 
Figure 5. Test for Concave  EU-Rationalizability
0 1 32 4 6
0
1
2
3
4
10
10
x2
x1
x2
a
B2(e2)
1806 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2020
dividing  ℝ + 2 . There are nine bundles in   ∩ ∂  2 ( 𝐩 2 ,  e 2  𝐩 2 ⋅  𝐱 2 ) , indicated by the 
small squares on the budget line.39 Condition (iii) requires that the expected utility 
of  𝐱 2 , computed with  u –ℓ , be higher than the expected utility of those nine bundles. 
This translates into nine linear inequalities in the unknowns  { u –(r) } r∈ . For exam-
ple, the bundle  𝐚 =  (1, λ2 +  (1 − λ) 3) for some  λ ∈  (0, 1) (which can easily be 
computed). The expected utility of  𝐚 is
  π 1  u –ℓ (1) +  π 2  u –ℓ (λ2 +  (1 − λ) 3) =  π 1 u –(1) +  π 2 [λ u –(2) +  (1 − λ) u –(3) ] , 
since  u –ℓ is piecewise linear. Condition (iii) requires
  π 1 u –(6) +  π 2 u –(1) ≥  π 1 u –(1) +  π 2 λ u –(2) +  π 2 (1 − λ) u –(3) . 
One could construct the remaining eight inequalities in a similar fashion.
IV. Implementation
We study the data collected from the well-known portfolio choice experiment in 
Choi et al. (2007), and from two other similar (more recent) experiments in Choi 
et al. (2014) and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018). The new tests developed in this 
paper allow us to evaluate, using a completely nonparametric approach, the empiri-
cal performance of different models of decision making under risk.
A. Model Performance
The experiment in Choi et al. (2007) was performed on 93 undergraduate sub-
jects at the University of California, Berkeley. Every subject was asked to make 
consumption choices on 50 decision problems under risk. Each subject divided her 
budget between two  Arrow-Debreu securities, with each security paying 1 token 
if the corresponding state was realized, and 0 otherwise. In a symmetric treatment 
applied to 47 subjects, each state of the world occurred with probability  1/2 , and 
in a (balanced) asymmetric treatment applied to 46 subjects, the probabilities of 
the states were  1/3 and  2/3 . These probabilities were objectively known. Lastly, 
income was normalized to 1, and the state prices were chosen at random and varied 
across rounds and subjects. In their analysis, Choi et al. (2007) first tested whether 
each subject’s behavior is consistent with maximizing a locally nonsatiated utility 
function by performing a GARP test (or, strictly speaking, a modified version of 
the GARP test which characterizes rationalizability at a given (Afriat) cost effi-
ciency threshold). Those subjects who passed GARP at a sufficiently high efficiency 
threshold were then fitted individually to a  two-parameter version of the disappoint-
ment aversion model of Gul (1991).40
The GRID method developed in this paper makes it possible to analyze the same 
data using purely revealed preference techniques. By applying the tests developed 
39 Their coordinates can be easily computed from  and  ∂  2 ( 𝐩 2 ,  e 2  𝐩 2 ·  𝐱 2 ) .
40 One parameter governed the distortion of state probabilities, and the other the degree of absolute/relative 
risk aversion.
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in Sections I and II, we can calculate the Afriat or critical cost efficiency indices at 
which a subject’s choice behavior is rationalizable by the expected utility (EU), dis-
appointment aversion (DA), and rank-dependent utility (RDU) models. We can also 
do the same with the additional requirement that the Bernoulli function is concave, 
using the results in Section III and in online Appendix Section A4; we shall refer to 
these models as cEU, cDA, and cRDU.
It is well known that all of these models are contained within the larger class 
of stochastically monotone utility functions; these utility functions give strictly 
higher utility to the bundle  𝐱 compared to  𝐲 whenever  𝐱 first-order stochastically 
dominates  𝐲 (with respect to the objective state probabilities) and gives them 
the same utility whenever they are stochastically equivalent. In the Choi et  al. 
(2007) experiment, there are just two states. In this case it is straightforward to 
check that when  π 1 =  π 2 = 1/2 , a utility function is stochastically monotone 
if and only if it is strictly increasing and symmetric, and when  π 2 >  π 1 , a util-
ity function  U is stochastically monotone if and only if it is strictly increasing 
and  U (a, b) > U (b, a) whenever  b > a . Lastly, stochastically monotone utility 
functions are contained within the still larger class of locally nonsatiated utility 
functions.
Afriat’s Theorem tells us that the rationalizability by locally nonsatiated utility 
maximization is observationally characterized by GARP. A test of stochastically 
monotone utility maximization was recently developed by Nishimura, Ok, and 
Quah (2017); this test has features similar to GARP and we shall refer to it as 
 F-GARP (where “F” stands for first-order stochastic dominance). In both cases, 
it is also known that the axioms can be extended to test for rationalizability on 
modified datasets and can therefore be used to calculate the critical cost efficiency 
index (see Section II) at which the dataset is rationalizable. A detailed explanation 
of these axioms can be found in online Appendix Section A5.
To recap, for each subject in Choi et  al. (2007), we calculate the critical cost 
efficiency index at which that subject is consistent with a given model. Altogether, 
there are eight models under consideration (locally nonsatiated utility maximiza-
tion (GARP), stochastically monotone utility maximization ( F-GARP), and RDU, 
DA, EU, cRDU, cDA, and cEU maximization). Therefore, to each subject under 
the asymmetric treatment, we assign eight efficiency indices (one for each model), 
while to each subject under the symmetric treatment, we assign six indices (since in 
the symmetric case, the RDU and DA models are identical, and the cRDU and cDA 
models are identical). When one model is, by definition, more stringent than another, 
its efficiency index must be weakly lower. So for a given subject, the efficiency 
index corresponding to GARP will be the highest, and the index corresponding to 
cEU will be the lowest. More generally, for each subject, the efficiency indices must 
be ordered the same way the models are nested, i.e.,
  e cEU ≤  e EU ;  e cDA ≤  e DA ;  e cEU ≤  e cDA ≤  e cRDU ≤  e RDU ;
 e EU ≤  e DA ≤  e RDU ≤  e F-GARP ≤  e GARP . 
Basic Rationalizability.—Table 4 gives pass rates for the different models at three 
different thresholds of the Afriat or critical cost efficiency index: 0.9, 0.95, and 1, 
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with the last corresponding to exact rationalizability.41 Across both treatments, 16 
out of 93 subjects obey GARP exactly and are therefore consistent with locally non-
satiated utility maximization, with subjects in the symmetric treatment performing 
distinctly better than those in the asymmetric treatment. Of the 16 subjects who pass 
GARP, only 4 pass  F-GARP, and still fewer subjects are rationalizable by the more 
stringent models. Given that we observe 50 decisions for every subject, it is not alto-
gether surprising that so many subjects should have violated GARP (let alone the 
more stringent conditions). The picture changes appreciably once we allow for some 
error in the form of cost inefficiencies: about 81 percent of the subjects pass GARP 
at efficiency thresholds exceeding 0.9, and 66 percent at thresholds exceeding 0.95, 
suggesting that a large fraction of the sample does indeed behave in a way that is 
broadly compatible with utility maximization.42,43
In Figure 6, we depict (separately) the distributions of efficiency indices across 
subjects for five models under the symmetric treatment, and six models under the 
asymmetric treatment.44 The models are nested by definition, so one would expect 
the efficiency distributions to be stacked, as indeed they are. In both panels, the top-
most curve represents the distribution of efficiency indices corresponding to GARP 
(in other words, rationalizability by locally nonsatiated utility maximization), and 
the bottommost curve represents the distribution of indices corresponding to cEU 
maximization, which is the most stringent model.
The EU Model.—We can see from Table  4 that around one-half of all sub-
jects passing GARP are then consistent with the EU model (at the 0.9 or 0.95 
41 The efficiency indices corresponding to GARP were also calculated by Choi et al. (2007). The indices corre-
sponding to all other models are new.
42 Furthermore, we know that the experiment provides a  high-powered test of utility maximization, in the sense 
that we can safely dismiss the possibility that this outcome would have occurred randomly. Indeed, as Choi et al. 
(2007) has already pointed out, these pass rates are very different from what arises if one instead calculates effi-
ciency indices for (uniformly) randomly generated budgetary data, following Bronars (1987); in that case, the 
proportion of synthetic (random) subjects passing GARP at efficiency thresholds exceeding 0.9 is very close to 0. 
(See Figure 4 in Choi et al. 2007.)
43 In principle, a dataset can fail GARP exactly and yet have an efficiency index that equals 1, since the index 
is defined by a supremum (see Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill 2018 for an example of this phenomenon). However, these 
situations are  nongeneric since they occur only when there are observations  t and  t′ such that  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t =  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t′ . In 
Table 4, the subjects listed as having  e = 1 also pass GARP exactly.
44 We exclude the cRDU and cDA distributions in order to avoid congestion; the interested reader can find these 
distributions in online Appendix Section A6.3.
Table 4—Pass Rates by Efficiency Threshold (Choi et al. 2007)
 π 1 = 1/2  π 1 ≠ 1/2 
 e = 0.90  e = 0.95  e = 1.00  e = 0.90  e = 0.95  e = 1.00 
GARP 38/47 (81%) 32/47 (68%) 12/47 (26%) GARP 37/46 (80%) 29/46 (63%) 4/46 (9%)
F-GARP 30/47 (64%) 23/47 (49%) 1/47 (2%) F-GARP 33/46 (72%) 26/46 (57%) 3/46 (7%)
RDU 30/47 (64%) 23/47 (49%) 1/47 (2%) RDU 33/46 (72%) 24/46 (52%) 2/46 (4%)
DA 20/46 (43%) 12/46 (26%) 1/46 (2%)
EU 30/47 (64%) 18/47 (38%) 1/47 (2%) EU 18/46 (39%) 12/46 (26%) 1/46 (2%)
cRDU 24/47 (51%) 12/47 (26%) 0/47 (0%) cRDU 25/46 (54%) 14/46 (30%) 1/46 (2%)
cDA 13/46 (28%) 6/46 (13%) 1/46 (2%)
cEU 23/47 (49%) 10/47 (21%) 0/47 (0%) cEU 11/46 (24%) 5/46 (11%) 0/46 (0%)
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 efficiency  thresholds).45 One might worry that the experimental design is insuffi-
ciently discriminating or powerful, so that, at a given efficiency threshold, random 
 GARP-consistent datasets would have passed the EU test at the same rate, but this 
is far from the case. We can confirm that the pass rate for the EU model on a large 
collection of randomly generated  GARP-consistent datasets is effectively zero. In 
fact, we can say even more. In Table 5, we report the results from a large collection 
of randomly generated datasets, all of which pass  F-GARP at the given efficency 
threshold (either 0.9 or 0.95).46 At the 0.9 threshold, the pass rate for the EU model 
in these randomly generated data is 13 percent under the symmetric treatment and 
0 percent under the asymmetric treatment; at the 0.95 threshold, the pass rates are 
effectively zero under both treatments. In other words, the observed EU pass rates 
are substantially higher than what would have arisen had the subjects been merely 
maximizing some stochastically monotone utility function. The cEU pass rates 
(where concavity is imposed on the Bernoulli function) are lower than the EU pass 
rates, but these too are substantially higher than the EU pass rates on randomly gen-
erated  F-GARP-consistent data.47
That said, it is worth emphasizing that there is a significant difference between 
the GARP and EU pass rates. Had the distributions for GARP and EU shown in 
Figure 6 been very close, we could have concluded that while subjects make mis-
takes when choosing from budget sets (since they fall short of consistency with 
basic rationality), they are nonetheless consistent with the EU model once that has 
been taken into account. However, since the distributions are distinct, that is not the 
case for a significant number of subjects.
We can have a sense of the preference misspecification, i.e., the extent to which 
the EU model misspecifies a subject’s preference, by looking at the difference in 
45 The precise ratios are  (30 + 18) / (38 + 37) = 64% at the 0.9 threshold, and  (18 + 12) / (32 + 29) = 49% 
at the 0.95 threshold. 
46 Online Appendix Section A6.1 describes the procedure that we use to randomly generate  GARP-consistent 
(or  F-GARP-consistent) datasets at a given efficiency threshold.
47 Naturally, the cEU pass rates on randomly generated  F-GARP-consistent data must be even lower than the 
EU pass rates reported in Table 5, since cEU is a more stringent model.
Figure 6. Distributions of Efficiency Indices (Choi et al. 2007)
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the efficiency index between GARP and the EU model.48 The median difference is 
0.027 for subjects in the symmetric treatment and 0.075 for those in the asymmetric 
treatment. It exceeds 0.05 for 17 out of 47 subjects in the symmetric treatment and 
30 out of 46 subjects in the asymmetric treatment.
The RDU and DA Models.—Can these models play a useful role in explaining 
behavior which is not captured by the EU model? Under the symmetric treatment, 
there is little scope for these models to capture the behavior of subjects not already 
compatible with the EU model, since the latter is already accommodating most of 
the subjects who pass  F-GARP. (Note the closeness of the  F-GARP and EU distri-
butions in panel A of Figure 6.)
However, the RDU model appears to capture the behavior of subjects more 
successfully than the EU model under the asymmetric treatment, covering almost 
all  F-GARP-consistent behavior (see Table 4 or panel B of Figure 6).49 When we 
require the Bernoulli function to be concave, the rank-dependent utility model can 
no longer account for nearly all  F-GARP-consistent behavior, but even then it cap-
tures many more subjects than expected utility (compare cRDU with cEU). On the 
other hand, this is not true of the DA model. Under both the symmetric and asym-
metric treatments, the DA pass rates are only slightly higher than the EU pass rates, 
and the same is true when comparing cDA with cEU.
Table 6 summarizes these observations. We record (as a fraction of all subjects 
within each treatment) the pass rates for the cEU and EU models. We also report 
the marginal contributions of the RDU and DA models (relative to EU or cEU) in 
explaining the data. For example, under the asymmetric treatment, at the 0.9 thresh-
old, 15 subjects out of 46 pass RDU but fail EU (see the row beginning RDU\EU); 
using this information, we can form a 95 percent binomial proportion confidence 
interval on the probability that a subject is rationalizable by RDU but not by EU, 
which turns out to be [0.195, 0.480].50
We conduct similar tests on the data collected by Choi et al. (2014) and Halevy, 
Persitz, and Zrill (2018). In both experiments, subjects allocated investment between 
48 We are broadly following Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) in using this measure of preference misspecifica-
tion. Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) compares the change in the money metric index (which is essentially Varian’s 
inconsistency index) between GARP and a parametric version of the DA model and interpret that difference as a 
measure of the misspecification.
49 We discuss the probability distortions which are required in order to rationalize these datasets in online 
Appendix Section A6.2.
50 All confidence intervals in this table are exact, and calculated using the  Clopper-Pearson method.
Table 5—Pass Rates for Random F-GARP-Consistent Data (Choi et al. 2007)
 π 1 = 1/2  π 1 ≠ 1/2 
 e = 0.90  e = 0.95  e = 0.90  e = 0.95 
RDU 25% 1% RDU 1% 0%
DA 0% 0%
EU 13% 1% EU 0% 0%
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two  Arrow-Debreu securities, with commonly known equiprobable states. Thus, the 
designs closely resemble the symmetric treatment in Choi et al. (2007).51
Analysis of the Choi et al. (2014) Dataset.—This experiment was conducted on 
1,182 CentERpanel adult members, where the latter is meant to be representative 
of the  Dutch-speaking population of the Netherlands. Each subject made allocation 
decisions on 25 linear budget sets; since this is just one-half of the number of deci-
sions in Choi et al. (2007), the pass rates should be higher if the subject population 
is the same, but it is not. As has already been noted by Choi et al. (2014), the pass 
rates for GARP at any efficiency threshold are instead lower those in Choi et al. 
(2007). This observation can now be extended further: the pass rates are across the 
board lower for all tests, and not just for GARP. This is clear if we compare Figure 
7 with panel A of Figure 6. That said, it is also clear from these two figures that 
certain qualitative features of the data are the same in both experiments. In particu-
lar, around one-half of the subjects who pass GARP at a given efficiency threshold 
are also consistent with the EU model. There is a significant difference in the pass 
rates between GARP and  F-GARP, and the EU model manages to explain a very 
large share of subjects who pass  F-GARP. In this experiment (but unlike in Choi 
et al. 2007), the cEU model also manages to account for many subjects who pass 
 F-GARP. Since the rank- dependent utility (equivalently, disappointment aversion) 
model is more stringent than  F-GARP, the model’s contribution, as measured by the 
proportion of subjects who obey RDU but not EU, or cRDU but not cEU (at some 
reasonable threshold), is modest. This echoes our finding for the symmetric treat-
ment in Choi et al. (2007).
51 Since the RDU and DA models coincide when states are equiprobable, the interesting distinction that we find 
between them in the asymmetric treatment in Choi et al. (2007) could not be further investigated. We think there is 
a case for including asymmetric treatments in future experiments, or even to have the same subject choosing under 
different state probabilities.
Table 6—Confidence Intervals on Preference Types (Choi et al. 2007)
 π 1 = 1/2 
 e = 0.90  e = 0.95 
Sample prop. Conf. interval Sample prop. Conf. interval
cEU 23/47 (0.489) [0.341, 0.639] 10/47 (0.213) [0.107, 0.357]
EU 30/47 (0.638) [0.485, 0.773] 18/47 (0.383) [0.245, 0.536]
EU\ cEU 7/47 (0.149) [0.062, 0.283] 8/47 (0.170) [0.076, 0.308]
RDU\EU 0/47 (0.000) [0.000, 0.075] 5/47 (0.106) [0.035, 0.231]
cRDU\cEU 1/47 (0.021) [0.001, 0.113] 2/47 (0.043) [0.005, 0.145]
 π 1 ≠ 1/2 
 e = 0.90  e = 0.95 
Sample prop. Conf. interval Sample prop. Conf. interval
cEU 11/46 (0.239) [0.126, 0.388] 5/46 (0.109) [0.036, 0.236]
EU 18/46 (0.391) [0.251, 0.546] 12/46 (0.261) [0.143, 0.411]
EU\cEU 7/46 (0.152) [0.063, 0.289] 7/46 (0.152) [0.063, 0.289]
DA\EU 2/46 (0.043) [0.005, 0.148] 0/46 (0.000) [0.000, 0.077]
RDU\EU 15/46 (0.326) [0.195, 0.480] 12/46 (0.261) [0.143, 0.411]
cDA\cEU 2/46 (0.043) [0.005, 0.148] 1/46 (0.022) [0.001, 0.115]
cRDU\cEU 14/46 (0.304) [0.177, 0.458] 9/46 (0.196) [0.094, 0.339]
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More details of our analysis of the Choi et al. (2014) data can be found in online 
Appendix Section A7. We also explore in that section  the relationship between a 
subject’s efficiency indices (for different models) and various  socioeconomic vari-
ables and outcomes (such as age, education, and wealth), extending the analysis in 
Choi et al. (2014).
Analysis of the Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) Dataset.—This experiment was 
conducted on 207 primarily undergraduate subjects at the University of British 
Columbia, with a set of portfolio choice problems forming the first part of a  two-part 
experiment. (We discuss the second part of the experiment in Section IVB.) Each 
subject made allocation decisions on 22 linear budget sets; since this number is 
lower than in Choi et al. (2007) (where each subject made decisions on 50 budget 
sets) and the sample population is similar, one would expect the pass rates in Halevy, 
Persitz, and Zrill (2018) to be generally higher than those in Choi et al. (2007), and 
this is what we find. However, the relative performance of the different models (rel-
ative to one another) is broadly similar across the two experiments. The EU model 
performs well: significantly more than half of the subjects who pass GARP (at some 
reasonable efficiency threshold) also pass the test for the EU model. That said, there 
is still a distinct difference in performance between the models; indeed a significant 
number of subjects who pass GARP fail  F-GARP (and thus EU). The RDU model 
makes only a modest contribution relative to EU, and similarly, consistency with the 
cRDU model is only slightly higher than with the cEU model. These observations 
are clear in Figure 8, which depicts the distributions of efficiency indices for differ-
ent models in this dataset.
While parametric models are easy to use and have other advantages, they will by 
definition fit a dataset less well than their nonparametric counterparts, so there is 
Figure 7. Distributions of Efficiency Indices (Choi et al. 2014)
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some advantage in developing procedures to assess the size of that loss of fit. Halevy, 
Persitz, and Zrill (2018) evaluated the basic rationality of their subjects (through 
GARP) and also the  goodness-of-fit of parametric versions of the rank-dependent 
and expected utility models. Following their example, we calculate the efficiency 
indices for the rank-dependent and expected utility models, with the Bernoulli func-
tions confined to the CRRA class.52 Their distributions are depicted in Figure 8 (see 
the  RDU-CRRA and  EU-CRRA curves).
Two things are clear from this exercise. First, the misspecification involved in 
using a parametric form appears to be substantial. This is suggested by Figure 8 
where the pass rates for GARP are much higher than that for  RDU-CRRA or 
 EU-CRRA.53 We can also measure the size of the preference misspecification by 
the difference in the efficiency index between GARP and  RDU-CRRA for each 
subject. This difference exceeds 0.05 for 118 (out of 207) subjects and exceeds 0.10 
for 76 subjects. These observations are broadly in line with those made by Halevy, 
52 The algorithm for calculating the critical cost efficiency index for the  EU-CRRA and  RDU-CRRA models is 
straightforward and does not involve the GRID method. Consider, for example, the  EU-CRRA case. At the efficiency 
vector  𝐞 =  (e, e, …, e) for  e ∈  (0, 1] , we can determine if the modified dataset   (𝐞) is consistent with  EU-CRRA 
for a given coefficient of relative risk aversion  η . We denote the  EU-CRRA utility function of the bundle  𝐱 ∈  ℝ + 2 by 
 U (𝐱; η) and the  EU-CRRA indirect utility at price  𝐩 and income  m by  V ( (𝐩, m) ; η) (the formula for which can 
be easily calculated). Note that   (𝐞) is rationalized by  U ( · ; η) if and only if  U ( 𝐱 t ; η) ≥ V ( ( 𝐩 t , e  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) ; η) 
for  t = 1, 2, …, T . This can be checked for a given  η , and by letting  η take different values we can establish if 
  (𝐞) is  EU-CRRA-rationalizable for a given  𝐞 . Lastly, we perform a binary search over  (0, 1] in order to determine 
the critical value of  e , as described in footnote 34.
53 For example, at any efficiency threshold of 0.9, more than 90 percent of subjects pass GARP but fewer than 
60 percent are consistent with  RDU-CRRA.
Figure 8. Distributions of Efficiency Indices (Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill 2018)
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Persitz, and Zrill (2018).54 Second, this misspecification is considerably worse than 
that for the corresponding nonparametric model; indeed, the difference in the effi-
ciency index between GARP and cRDU exceeds 0.05 for 82 (out of 207) subjects 
and exceeds 0.10 for 38 subjects.
Online Appendix Section A8 provides further analysis of the data collected by 
Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018). Note that Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) makes 
use of Varian’s efficiency index, the calculation of which is feasible in the case of 
GARP and the parametric models they consider. We have not used Varian’s index 
because its calculation for all of the nonparametric models that we consider is too 
computationally demanding. We did, however, calculate Varian’s index (exactly) for 
GARP and  F-GARP and also have good approximations for the EU model. In all 
three cases, the Afriat and Varian indices are highly correlated. Our Varian indices 
are obtained via a new search algorithm (see online Appendix Section A9) that may 
be of independent interest.
Comparison with Empirical Findings in Other Papers.—There is a large empiri-
cal literature that evaluates the performance of different models of choice under risk 
using experimental or field data, and our results appear to be broadly in line with the 
findings obtained in earlier studies, even though the very different empirical meth-
ods employed make formal comparisons difficult. In particular, other papers have 
concluded that the rank-dependent utility model performs well (see, for example, 
Bruhin,  Fehr-Duda, and Epper 2010 and Barseghyan et  al. 2013 and their refer-
ences), which is something that we also observe, at least in the asymmetric treatment 
in Choi et al. (2007). We find that the expected utility model captures a significant 
number of subjects, though by no means everyone, which is broadly consistent with 
the not altogether uncommon finding that this canonical model puts in a respectable 
performance (see, for example, Hey and Orme 1994). Lastly, the relatively poor per-
formance of the disappointment aversion model has also been noted in some other 
studies such as Hey and Orme (1994) and Barseghyan et al. (2013).
B.  Out-of-Sample Predictions
We use the data from Choi et al. (2007) and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) to 
make  out-of-sample predictions. For different reasons, neither experiment is ideal 
for our purpose, but these applications are still indicative about the potential useful-
ness of our procedures.
The Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) Data.—In the second part of the experiment 
in Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018), each subject was asked to make a number of 
choices between two lotteries: lottery A, which pays off some amount for sure, and 
lottery B, which has two unequal but equiprobable payoffs.55 The objective was 
to adjudicate between two competing parametric recovery approaches, one using 
54 Using Varian’s index rather than Afriat’s, Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) reaches a similar conclusion that 
the contribution to inconsistency from parametric misspecification is large relative to that from the failure of basic 
rationality.
55 For example, lottery A might pay 50 for sure and lottery B might pay 60 and 40 with equal probability.
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 nonlinear least squares (NLLS) and another using a money metric index (MMI) 
(which is essentially Varian’s efficiency index). The recovery exercise first involved 
fitting (using either procedure) the  RDU-CRRA model to each subject’s portfolio 
choice data (from the first part of the experiment). This yielded two parameters for 
each subject:  β , which governs the probability distortion (see (13)), and  η , the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion. With these parameters, one could then predict the 
subject’s choice between any two lotteries A and B. The lotteries A and B were not 
randomly chosen, but instead  tailor-made to each subject so that the two recovery 
methods would lead to different predictions for each pair.
Our nonparametric approach could also be used to predict lottery choices. First, 
for a given model, say RDU, we calculate a subject’s efficiency index. Suppose the 
index is  e ∗ ; then we test whether a preference for A over B is consistent with the 
RDU model given the dataset  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ( e ∗ ) ) } t=1 T (in the sense explained in Section IC). 
Since  { ( 𝐱 t ,  B t ( e ∗ ) ) } t=1 T is  RDU-rationalizable by definition, either a preference for A 
over B or its reverse will be consistent. It is also possible that both are consistent, in 
which case the model cannot discriminate between these lotteries; note that this is 
where a nonparametric model differs from a parametric model, since the recovered 
parameters are typically unique in the latter (which lead to unique predictions).
In the experiment, each subject (of 207) was asked to make 9 pairwise choices, 
giving 1,863 binary comparisons in total. Using the RDU model, we find that only 
79 of these cases (around 4 percent) are discriminating; among these 79 cases, 48 
are correctly predicted, about 61 percent. Under cRDU, discrimination is sharpened, 
with 957 (51 percent) being discriminating, and among these, 508 (53 percent) are 
correctly predicted. Lastly, under  RDU-CRRA, which is a parametric model, all 
1,863 binary comparisons are discriminating and 1,051 of these (56 percent) are 
correctly predicted;56 this result is in line with Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018), 
which correctly predicts 54 percent of 1,827 binary choices when the  RDU-CRRA 
parameters are recovered using the MMI method (which means, given the special 
way lotteries were chosen in that experiment, that the NLLS method is correct for 
46 percent of the choices).57,58
The Choi et  al. (2007) Data.—The special way in which lotteries are chosen 
in the Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018) experiment gives us only limited informa-
tion on whether our nonparametric procedure is discriminating enough to be useful 
for making  out-of-sample predictions. To explore this issue further, we conduct a 
simple but instructive exercise using the data collected from the symmetric treat-
ment in Choi et  al. (2007). We first identify those subjects with RDU efficiency 
indices exceeding 0.9. For each subject, we choose an observation at random; call 
it  t′ . We then randomly choose a bundle  𝐲 that is undominated59 by  𝐱 t′ and sat-
isfies  𝐩 t′ · 𝐲 = 0.9  𝐩 t′ ·  𝐱 t′ . We then ask whether we could “predict” the choice 
between  𝐱 t′ and  𝐲 from the remaining 49 portfolio choice observations (using the 
56 In a sense,  RDU-CRRA is both correct more often and wrong more often than cRDU.
57 Notice that 4 subjects were removed in Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018), giving a sample of 203 subjects.
58 Since the lottery pairs in this experiment were chosen in a very special way, the reader should take care not to 
conclude that these methods, whether parametric or otherwise, make correct predictions only one-half of the time 
when presented with a “random” pair of lotteries.
59 By undominated, we mean that if  𝐲 =  (a, b) then  𝐱 t′ ≱  (a, b) and  𝐱 t′ ≱  (b, a) .
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procedure set out in Section  IC). Since we have chosen subjects with efficiency 
indices above 0.9, a preference for  𝐱 t′ over  𝐲 must be consistent with the 49 portfolio 
choice decisions. The issue is whether a preference for  𝐲 over  𝐱 t′ is also consistent 
with the 49 observations; if so, it means that the nonparametric procedure has failed 
to be discriminating “out of sample.”
Under RDU, 30 of 47 subjects have efficiency indices exceeding 0.9. For each 
of these subjects, we perform 2 independent (i.e., drawn from possibly different 
budgets) predictive exercises and find that 50 of 60 (83 percent) of these are predic-
tively discriminating. In the case of cRDU, 24 of 47 subjects have efficiency indices 
exceeding 0.9 and we find that 46 of 48 (96 percent) of the predictive exercises are 
discriminating. Obviously this simple exercise is no more than indicative, but it does 
suggest that our nonparametric procedure is capable of making sharp predictions  out 
of sample.
Appendix
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: 
We require the following lemma.
LEMMA 1: Let  { C t } t=1 T be a finite collection of constraint sets in  핉 +  s – that are com-
pact and downward closed (i.e., if  x ∈  C t then so is  y ∈  핉 +  s ¯ such that  y < x ) 
and let the functions  {ϕ ( · , t) } t=1 T be continuous and increasing in all dimensions. 
Suppose that there is a finite set   of  핉 + , a strictly increasing function  u – :  →  핉 + , 
and  { M t } t=1 T such that the following holds:
(A1)  M t ≥ ϕ ( 𝐮–  (𝐱) , t)  for all 𝐱 ∈  C t ∩ 
and 
(A2)  M t > ϕ ( 𝐮–  (𝐱) , t)  for all 𝐱 ∈  ( C t \∂ C t ) ∩ , 
where   =    s – and  u –(x) =  ( u –( x 1 ) ,  u –( x 2 ) , …,  u –( x  s – ) ) . Then there is a Bernoulli 
function  u :  핉 + →  핉 + that extends  u – such that
(A3)  M t ≥ ϕ (𝐮 (𝐱) , t)  for all x ∈  C t 
and 
(A4) if  x ∈  C t and  M t = ϕ (u (x) , t) , then  x ∈ ∂ C t ∩  and  M t = ϕ ( u –(x) , t) .
Remark 1: The property (A4) needs some explanation. Conditions (A1) and 
(A2) allow for the possibility that  M t = ϕ ( u – (x′) , t) for some  x′ ∈ ∂ C t ∩  ; we 
denote the set of points in  ∂ C t ∩  with this property by  X′ . Clearly any extension 
u will preserve this property, i.e.,  M t = ϕ(u (x′) , t) for all  x′ ∈ X′ . Property (A4) 
says that we can choose  u such that for all  x ∈  C t \X′ , we have  M t > ϕ (u (x) , t) .
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PROOF:
We shall prove this result by induction on the dimension of the space containing 
the constraint sets. It is trivial to check that the claim is true if  s – = 1 . In this case,   
consists of a finite set of points on  ℝ + and each  C t is a closed interval with 0 as its 
minimum. Now let us suppose that the claim holds for  s – = m and we shall prove 
it for  s – = m + 1 . If, for each  t , there is a strictly increasing and continuous utility 
function  u t :  ℝ + →  ℝ + extending  u – such that (A3) and (A4) hold, then the same 
conditions will hold for the increasing and continuous function  u =  min t  u t . So we 
can focus our attention on constructing  u t for a single constraint set  C t .
Suppose   =  {0,  r 1 ,  r 2 ,  r 3 , …,  r I } , with  r 0 = 0 <  r i <  r i+1 , for 
 i = 1, 2, …, I − 1 . Let  r – = max {r ∈  ℝ + :  (r, 0, 0, …, 0) ∈  C t } and suppose that 
 ( r i , 0, 0, …, 0) ∈  C t if and only if  i ≤ N (for some  N ≤ I ). Consider the collec-
tion of sets of the form  D i =  {𝐲 ∈  ℝ + m  :  ( r i , 𝐲) ∈  C t } (for  i = 1, 2, …, N ); this 
is a finite collection of compact and downward closed sets in  ℝ + m. By the induction 
hypothesis applied to  { D i } i=1 N , with  {ϕ ( u –( r i ) , · , t) } i=1 N as the collection of func-
tions, there is a strictly increasing function  u ∗ :  ℝ + →  ℝ + extending  u – such that
(A5)  M t ≥ ϕ ( u –( r i ) ,  𝐮 ∗ (𝐲) , t)  for all  ( r i , 𝐲) ∈  C t 
and 
(A6)  if  ( r i , 𝐲) ∈  C t  and   M t = ϕ ( u –( r i ) ,  𝐮 ∗ (𝐲) , t) ,
 then  ( r i , 𝐲) ∈ ∂ C t ∩   and   M t = ϕ ( 𝐮–  ( r i , 𝐲) , t) . 
For each  r ∈  [0,  r –] , define
  U (r) =  {u ≤  u ∗ (r)  :  max {ϕ (u,  𝐮 ∗ (𝐲) , t) :  (r, 𝐲) ∈  C t } ≤  M t } . 
This set is nonempty; indeed  u –( r k ) =  u ∗ ( r k ) ∈ U (r) , where  r k is the largest ele-
ment in   that is weakly smaller than  r . This is because, if  (r, 𝐲) ∈  C t then so is ( r k , 𝐲) , and (A5) guarantees that  ϕ ( u –( r k ) ,  𝐮 ∗ (𝐲) , t) ≤  M t . The downward closedness 
of  C t and the fact that  u ∗ is increasing also guarantees that  U (r) ⊆ U (r′) when-
ever  r < r′ . Now define  u ̃(r) = sup U (r) ; the function  u ̃ has a number of significant 
properties. (i)  For  r ∈  ,  u ̃(r) =  u ∗ (r) =  u –(r) (by the induction hypothesis). (ii) 
u ̃ is a nondecreasing function since  U is nondecreasing. (iii)   u ̃(r) >  u –( r k ) if  r >  r k , 
where  r k is largest element in  smaller than  r . Indeed, because  C t is compact and  ϕ 
continuous,  ϕ ( u ̃(r) ,  𝐮 ∗ (𝐲) , t) ≤  M t for all  (r, 𝐲) ∈  C t . By way of contradiction, 
suppose  u ̃(r) =  u –( r k ) and hence  u ̃(r) <  u ∗ (r) . It follows from the definition of 
u ̃(r) that, for any sequence  u n , with  u ̃(r) <  u n <  u ∗ (r) and  lim n→∞  u n =  u ̃(r) , 
there is  (r,  𝐲 n ) ∈  C t such that  ϕ ( u n ,  𝐮 ∗ ( 𝐲 n ) , t) >  M t . Since  C t is compact, we 
may assume with no loss of generality that  𝐲 n →  ?ˆ?  and  (r,  ?ˆ? ) ∈  C t , from which 
we obtain  ϕ ( u ̃(r) ,  𝐮 ∗ ( ?ˆ? ) , t) =  M t . Since  C t is downward closed,  ( r k ,  ?ˆ? ) ∈  C t 
and, since  u –( r k ) =  u ∗ ( r k ) , we have  ϕ ( 𝐮 ∗ ( r k ,  ?ˆ? ) , t) =  M t . This can only occur if ( r k ,  ?ˆ? ) ∈ ∂ C t ∩  (because of (A6)), but it is clear that  ( r k ,  ?ˆ? ) ∉ ∂ C t since  ( r k ,  ?ˆ? ) 
<  (r,  ?ˆ? ) . (iv) If  r n <  r i for all  n and  r n →  r i ∈  , then  u ̃( r n ) →  u ∗ ( r i ) . Suppose 
to the contrary, that the limit is  u ˆ <  u ∗ ( r i ) =  u ¯( r i ) . Since  u ∗ is continuous, we 
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can assume, without loss of generality, that  u ̃( r n ) <  u ∗ ( r n ) . By the compactness 
of  C t , the continuity of  ϕ , and the definition of  u ̃, there is  ( r n ,  𝐲 n ) ∈  C t such that 
 ϕ ( u ̃( r n ) ,  𝐮 ∗ ( 𝐲 n ) , t) =  M t . This leads to  ϕ ( u ˆ,  𝐮 ∗ (𝐲′) , t) =  M t , where  𝐲′ is an accu-
mulation point of  𝐲 n and  ( r i , 𝐲′) ∈  C t . But since  ϕ is strictly increasing, we obtain 
 ϕ ( u ∗ ( r i ) ,  𝐮 ∗ (𝐲′) , t) >  M t , which contradicts (A5).
Given the properties of  u ̃, we can find a continuous and strictly increasing func-
tion  u t such that  u t extends  u ¯, i.e.,  u t (r) =  u ¯(r) for  r ∈  ,  u t (r) <  u ∗ (r) for 
all  r ∈  ℝ + \ and  u t (r) <  u ̃(r) ≤  u ∗ (r) for all  r ∈  [0,  r –] \ . (In fact we can 
choose  u t to be smooth everywhere except possibly on   .) We claim that (A3) and 
(A4) are satisfied for  C t . To see this, note that for  r ∈  and  (r, 𝐲) ∈  C t , the induc-
tion hypothesis guarantees that (A5) and (A6) hold and they will continue to hold 
if  u ∗ is replaced by  u t . In the case where  r ∉  and  (r, 𝐲) ∈  C t , since  u t (r) <  u ̃(r) 
and  ϕ is increasing, we obtain  M t > ϕ ( 𝐮 t (r, 𝐲) , t) . ∎
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
This follows immediately from Lemma 1 if we set  C t =  B ¯t , and  M t = ϕ ( 𝐮–  ( 𝐱 t ) , t) . If  u – obeys conditions (6) and (7) then it obeys conditions (A1) and (A2). The ratio-
nalizability of   by  {ϕ (·, t) } t=1 T then follows from (A3). ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 (Sufficiency):
Suppose there is  u – :  →  ℝ + satisfying (i) to (iii). Then (i) guarantees that  u –ℓ is 
strictly increasing on  ℝ + and (ii) guarantees that  u –ℓ is concave. We claim that with  u –ℓ 
as the Bernoulli function,  𝐱 t has higher expected utility than any bundle in  B t ( e t ) . 
By definition,  u –ℓ is linear between adjacent values of   ; it follows that the map from (a, b) to its expected utility  π 1  u –ℓ (a) +  π 2  u –ℓ (b) is also linear for all  (a, b) ∈  [r, r′] × 
[m, m′] , where  r and  r′ are adjacent points in   (and similarly  m and  m′ ). A linear 
map is maximized at an extreme point; thus if  ( [r, r′] ×  [m, m′] ) ∩ ∂  ( 𝐩 t ,  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) 
is nonempty then there is a bundle  ( a ∗ ,  b ∗ ) maximizing expected utility in this set 
with either  a ∗ ∈  {r, r′} or  b ∗ ∈  {m, m′} . More generally, there must be a bun-
dle  ( a ∗∗ ,  b ∗∗ ) that maximizes expected utility in   ( 𝐩 t ,  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) and is contained in 
 ∂  ( 𝐩 t ,  e t  𝐩 t ·  𝐱 t ) ∩  . It follows that (16) is sufficient to guarantee the optimality 
of  𝐱 t in  B t ( e t ) . ∎
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